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I. INTRODUCTION 
In September 2003, the staid mutual fund industry was rocked by an 
announcement from New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer that his 
office had settled for $40 million charges of improper trading in mutual 
fund shares by hedge-fund Canary Investment Management LLC, and 
related entities.1  According to Spitzer, various mutual funds had allowed 
Canary to engage in late trading and market timing with respect to fund 
shares.2  Mutual fund shares are priced once a day at 4 PM (EST).  Orders 
to buy or sell fund shares placed at or before 4 PM on a particular day are 
executed at that day’s price, and orders placed after 4 PM on a particular 
day are supposed to be executed at the next day’s price.  Late trading 
involves placing orders after 4 PM but receiving the price determined as 
of 4 PM that day.3  With late trading, traders are attempting to capitalize 
on market moving information released publicly after 4 PM.4  As 
Spitzer’s complaint against Canary put it, “[l]ate trading can be 
analogized to betting today on yesterday’s horse races.”5 
                                                     
 ∗  Associate Professor, Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky University.  I 
would like to thank Professor Antony Page for his comments on this Article. 
 1. Randall Smith & Tom Lauricella, Spitzer Alleges Mutual Funds Allowed Fraudulent 
Trading, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 2003, at A1. 
 2. Id. 
 3. SEC v. JB Oxford Holdings, Inc., Litigation Release No. 18850, 83 S.E.C. Docket 1988 
(Aug. 25, 2004), available at 2004 WL 1908193, at *2; Complaint at 3, State v. Canary Capital 
Partners, LLC, No. 402830/2003 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Sept. 3, 2003), available at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/sep/canary_complaint.pdf [hereinafter Spitzer Complaint]. 
 4. For example, if an industry-leading technology company announced unexpectedly strong 
earnings after 4 PM, it is likely that shares in technology companies and hence shares in mutual funds 
with large investments in technology companies would be up the next day.  Therefore, late traders 
enter buy orders for shares of technology-focused mutual funds after the announcement but get the 
pre-announcement price on the shares.  Karen Damato, ‘Timing’ at Mutual Funds Can Cost 2% a 
Year, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2003, at C1. 
 5. Spitzer Complaint, supra note 3, at 3. 
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Market timing involves the frequent trading of mutual fund shares in 
an effort to take advantage of inefficiencies in mutual fund share 
pricing.6  A popular market-timing strategy entails trading in 
international stock mutual funds.  For many international funds, prices 
set at 4 PM are partially based on closing prices of Asian stocks, which 
were determined more than ten hours earlier.  If the U.S. market has risen 
sharply, it is a good bet that Asian markets will rise the next day.  
Knowing this, a trader buys shares in an international fund right before 
the 4 PM cutoff in the United States and sells the shares at a profit the 
next day, assuming the expected rise in Asian stocks materializes.7 
Late trading is illegal.8  Market timing is not in and of itself illegal,9 
but most mutual fund companies discourage it and have public written 
policies to that effect.10  Both late trading and market timing hurt long-
term fund investors because the late traders and market timers are 
“siphoning off some of the profit that would otherwise have gone to 
those funds’ long-term investors.”11  Some portfolio managers, 
nonetheless, have allowed select firms like Canary to engage in such 
 
                                                     
 6. JB Oxford Holdings, 2004 WL 1908193, at *2 (quoting SEC complaint). 
 7. Damato, supra note 4. 
 8. SEC v. Mutuals.com, Inc., Litigation Release No. 18489, 81 S.E.C. Docket 2402 (Dec. 4, 
2003), available at 2003 WL 22873178, at *5. 
 9. Disclosure Regarding Market Timing and Selective Disclosure of Portfolio Holdings, 
Release Nos. 33-8343 & IC-26287, 81 S.E.C. Docket 2425 (Dec. 11, 2003), available at 2003 WL 
22926837, at *13 [hereinafter Market Timing Disclosure Release]. 
 10. Spitzer Complaint, supra note 3, at 2; Tom Lauricella, Two-Tier System: For Staid Mutual-
Fund Industry, Growing Probe Signals Shake-up, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 2003, at A1. 
 11. Damato, supra note 4. 
[M]arket timing may dilute the value of long-term shareholders’ interests in a mutual 
fund if the fund calculates NAV using closing prices that are no longer accurate.  Dilution 
may occur, for example, if fund shares are overpriced because redeeming shareholders 
will receive a windfall at the expense of the shareholders that remain in the fund.  
Similarly, dilution may occur when a fund sells its shares at a price lower than its NAV. 
Market Timing Disclosure Release, supra note 9, at *4. 
  To understand how the returns of a long-term fund investor can be diluted by short-
term trading, consider a simple hypothetical example: a stock fund with just 24 investors 
holding stocks valued at $2,400, or $100 for each investor.  A short-term trader who has 
special insight that the share price will rise tomorrow then invests $100 for the 25th fund 
share. 
  The fund’s portfolio manager, receiving notice of that cash inflow after the market is 
closed, can’t put that additional cash to work immediately.  So the fund heads into the 
next trading day with the same stock holdings as before and an added $100 in cash.  It’s a 
good day as expected, and the fund’s stocks rise 20%. But because of the cash cushion, 
the fund’s overall portfolio gains only 19.2%, not the full 20%. 
Damato, supra note 4. 
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trading in exchange for indirect payments from the traders to the 
portfolio managers.12 
The Canary settlement was so shocking because Spitzer’s complaint 
against Canary cited four large fund companies, Bank of America Corp., 
Bank One Corp., Janus Capital Corp., and Strong Capital Management 
Inc., each of which manages billions of dollars of investors’ funds.13  
Further, Spitzer noted that “future charges were ‘almost certain’ to be 
brought against mutual-fund companies themselves and possibly 
others.”14  Spitzer was of course correct: new revelations of improprieties 
at mutual funds became seemingly a daily occurrence thereafter, and one 
big fund company after another was pulled into what was soon labeled 
the “mutual fund scandal.”15 
Not surprisingly, the mutual fund scandal has precipitated 
congressional hearings, new regulations, and a flood of SEC enforcement 
actions and private lawsuits against mutual fund companies and their 
board members, officers, and investment advisers.16  Many of these 
actions and lawsuits allege, among other things, violations of section 
36(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA).17  Section 36(a) 
                                                     
 12. See Tom Lauricella, Scandal Reaches Far and High, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2005, at R1 (“In 
return for allowing this trading, many of these executives asked for or accepted payments in the form 
of added investments on which the fund companies would earn greater fees—a particularly welcome 
source of revenue during the bear market when other fee-generating assets were often declining.”).  
As described in the Spitzer Complaint: 
Typically, Canary would agree with the fund manager on target funds to be timed . . . and 
then move the timing money quickly between those funds and a resting place in a money 
market or similar fund in the same fund family.  By keeping the money—often many 
million dollars—in the family, Canary assured the manager that he or she would collect 
management and other fees on the amount [since these fees are typically based on the 
percentage of assets under management] whether it was the target fund, the resting fund, 
or moving in between. . . . 
  . . . As an additional inducement for allowing the timing, fund managers often 
received “stick assets.”  These were typically long-term investments made not in the 
mutual fund in which the timing activity was permitted, but in one of the fund manager’s 
financial vehicles (e.g., a bond fund or a hedge fund run by the manager) that assured a 
steady flow of fees to the manager. 
Spitzer Complaint, supra note 3, at 12. 
 13. Id. at 18–41. 
 14. Smith & Lauricella, supra note 1. 
 15. See Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-26520, 83 
S.E.C. Docket 1384 (July 27, 2004), available at 2004 WL 1672374, at *2 [hereinafter Investment 
Company Governance Release] (stating that amendments were proposed “in the wake of a troubling 
series of enforcement actions” involving mutual fund abuse). 
 16. See James N. Benedict & Mary K. Dulka, Recent Developments in Litigation Under the 
Investment Company Act of 1940, in THE INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE, 2004: A SEMINAR 
FOR ’40 ACT LAWYERS 1149, 1224 (Barry P. Barbash & Paul F. Roye eds., 2004) (stating that there 
has been a “raft of private civil lawsuits” based on improper trading allegations). 
 17. Id. at 1227. 
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provides a federal cause of action for “a breach of fiduciary duty 
involving personal misconduct in respect of any registered investment 
company” by an officer, director, investment adviser, or principal 
underwriter of an investment company, among others.18  The ICA, 
however, provides no guidance as to the content of this fiduciary duty or 
as to the meaning of the phrase “involving personal misconduct.”  Nor is 
there much relevant legislative history, case law, or scholarly 
commentary on these issues. 
This Article seeks to fill the gap.  Part II outlines the typical 
operating structure of a mutual fund and describes the roles of the fund’s 
board of directors and investment adviser.  Part III provides background 
on the ICA and its application to a mutual fund.  Part IV explores in 
depth the “breach of fiduciary duty” standard under ICA section 36(a).  
After examining relevant state law on fiduciary duties, it concludes that 
given the unique structure of a mutual fund, federal courts should tailor 
the standard specifically for the investment company industry, drawing 
on state law when appropriate.  Part V addresses in detail the “involving 
personal misconduct” standard under section 36(a).  It concludes that, in 
light of relevant legislative history, federal courts should interpret the 
standard to reflect the substance of the business-judgment rule.  Lastly, 
Part VI states a brief conclusion. 
II. MUTUAL FUND STRUCTURE 
A mutual fund pools the money of investors to collectively invest in 
stocks, bonds, and other securities.19  Investors receive shares in the fund 
in exchange for their money.20  This allows mutual fund investors to get 
the benefit of professional investment management and diversification, 
because the fund’s assets are typically invested in diversified portfolios 
selected by professional money managers.21  Mutual funds provide “an 
economical, convenient way for the average investor to benefit from 
professional money management much like large institutions and 
                                                     
 18. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (2000).  Because section 29 of ICA amended the Bankruptcy Act of 
1898, it was not codified in Title 15.  See Pub. L. No. 768, § 29, 54 Stat. 835 (1940) (“Section 67 of 
[the Bankruptcy Act of 1898] is amended by adding at the end thereof the following . . . .”).  
Accordingly, section 30 of the ICA is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29, section 31 at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
30, and so on.    
 19. INV. CO. INST., 2004 MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK 1 (44th ed. 2004), available at 
http://www.ici.org/pdf/2004_factbook.pdf [hereinafter MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK]. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 1, 9. 
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wealthy investors receive.”22  Many average investors have in fact 
invested in mutual funds.  “An estimated 91 million individuals and 53.3 
million U.S. households owned mutual funds in 2003.”23  As of 
December 31, 2003, mutual funds had assets under management of 
approximately $7.4 trillion.24 
Each mutual fund is a separate legal entity—typically either a 
corporation or a business trust.25  Unlike a typical corporation, however, 
a mutual fund is normally externally managed.26  “A mutual fund is a 
‘mere shell,’ a pool of assets consisting mostly of portfolio securities that 
belongs to the individual investors holding shares in the fund.”27  Instead 
of having its own employees, a mutual fund retains third-party service 
providers to manage the fund’s investment portfolio, market and sell the 
fund shares to investors, execute shareholder transactions, maintain 
shareholder records, etc.28  Broad oversight of these various service 
providers is provided by the fund’s board of directors, which is elected 
by its shareholders.29 
A fund typically is organized and launched by its investment 
adviser.30  The investment adviser handles portfolio management and 
most other day-to-day operations of the fund.31  A fund’s investment 
adviser provides these services to the fund pursuant to a written advisory 
agreement, which under the ICA has to be approved by a majority of the 
fund’s directors and shareholders.32  Typically, the advisory agreement 
specifies that the investment adviser will manage the fund’s investments 
and administer its operations subject to the oversight of the fund’s board 
                                                     
 22. Id. at 9. 
 23. Id. at 79. 
 24. Id. at 1. 
 25. ROBERT A. ROBERTSON, FUND GOVERNANCE: LEGAL DUTIES OF INVESTMENT COMPANY 
DIRECTORS § 2.02 (2001); Philip H. Newman, Legal Considerations in Forming a Mutual Fund, 
SJ095 ALI-ABA 22, 22 (2003). 
 26. MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK, supra note 19, at 2; Task Force on Fund Dir’s Guidebook 
(2002-2003), Am. Bar Ass’n, Fund Director’s Guidebook, 59 BUS. LAW. 201, 207 (2003). 
 27. Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 405 (2d Cir. 1977), cited in Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 
471, 480–81 (1979).  See also Zell v. InterCapital Income Sec., Inc., 675 F.2d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 
1982) (“The fund is a shell.”). 
 28. MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK, supra note 19, at 7–8. 
 29. Id. at 8.  Technically, if a mutual fund is organized as a business trust, it has a board of 
trustees instead of a board of directors and hence trustees instead of directors.  ROBERTSON, supra 
note 25, at viii n.7.  References in this Article to a board of directors and directors include a board of 
trustees and trustees. 
 30. Tannenbaum, 552 F.2d at 405; MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK, supra note 19, at 8.  See also 
ROBERTSON, supra note 25, § 6.01, n.3. 
 31. ROBERTSON, supra note 25, § 6.01; Donald W. Glazer, A Study of Mutual Fund Complexes, 
119 U. PA. L. REV. 205, 209 (1970). 
 32. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a), (c) (2000). 
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of directors.33  Managing investments entails selecting securities based 
on the adviser’s market research and the fund’s specified investment 
objectives and risk tolerance.34  The adviser also provides the fund with 
office space and staff and maintains certain books and records for the 
fund.35 
The fund pays the investment adviser a fee for providing these 
services usually equal to a percentage of the fund’s net assets.36  This 
percentage may range from 0.05% to 1.50% of net assets.37  For many 
larger funds, the fee arrangement includes so-called “breakpoints.”38  
Under a breakpoint structure, the fee percentage decreases at specified 
fund-asset levels.39  For example, the advisory agreement may provide 
that the adviser is entitled to a fee of 1.00% on fund net assets up to $500 
million, 0.875% on fund assets more than $500 million and up to $1 
billion, and 0.75% on fund assets more than $1 billion.  This reflects 
anticipated economies of scale to be realized by the investment adviser.40  
Basically, the cost to the adviser, as a percentage of fund assets, to run a 
$2-billion fund should be much smaller than the cost to run a $200-
million fund.41  Breakpoints allow the fund to benefit from these 
economies of scale.42 
A mutual fund is legally required to redeem an investor’s shares 
upon the request of the investor at a per-share price based on the then-
current value of the fund’s net assets.43  In part because of this 
redemption obligation, mutual funds generally continuously offer and 
sell shares to the public in an effort to maintain or increase assets under 
management, notwithstanding redemptions from existing investors.44  
Thus, attracting new investors can be critical to the continued growth and 
success of a fund.45  This job is handled by the fund’s distributor, which 
                                                     
 33. ROBERTSON, supra note 25, § 6.02[1]. 
 34. MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK, supra note 19, at 9. 
 35. Tannenbaum, 552 F.2d at 405; ROBERTSON, supra note 25, § 6.02[1]. 
 36. Tannenbaum, 552 F.2d at 405. 
 37. ROBERTSON, supra note 25, § 6.02[2]. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK, supra note 19, at 12.  See also ROBERTSON, supra note 25, § 
7.01, at 7-2. 
 44. See id.; see also TAMAR FRANKEL & ANN TAYLOR SCHWING, THE REGULATION OF MONEY 
MANAGERS § 5.08[C][1], at 5-200 (2d ed. Supp. 2005) (describing how, because shares are 
redeemable, “assets will shrink without constant distribution of new securities”). 
 45. See ROBERTSON, supra note 25, § 7.01, at 7-2. 
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is typically a separate legal entity wholly owned, either directly or 
indirectly, by the fund’s investment adviser.46  A fund’s distributor 
provides services pursuant to a written distribution agreement, which 
must be approved by the fund’s board of directors.47 
A fund’s distributor may market shares directly to the public or 
indirectly through other financial intermediaries such as brokerage firms, 
banks, retirement plans, financial planners, and life insurance 
companies.48  These financial intermediaries are typically paid a 
commission for selling the fund shares. 49  This commission may be 
derived from a sales charge paid by the purchaser of fund shares, from 
fees charged the fund for distribution, or from the adviser’s profits.50  To 
provide investors with a choice of fee structure, a mutual fund may offer 
multiple classes of shares, each of which has a different fee structure.51  
For example, a fund may offer class A shares where investors pay an 
upfront sales charge (a front-end load), class B shares where investors 
pay a fee when cashing out (a back-end load), and class C shares where 
investors pay no load.52  Sellers of class A shares are compensated from 
the front-end load and a small annual charge paid by the fund.  Sellers of 
class B shares are compensated by a higher annual charge paid by the 
fund and the back-end load when the shares are sold.  Sellers of class C 
shares are compensated by an even higher annual charge paid by the 
fund.53  The use of fund assets to market and sell fund shares must be 
done in accordance with a distribution plan approved by the fund’s board 
of directors.54 
                                                     
 46. See id. at 7-3; see also Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 405 (2d Cir. 1977) (“The sale 
of fund shares to new investors is generally the responsibility of a ‘principal underwriter’ who is 
usually the adviser itself or a close affiliate.”). 
 47. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (2000). 
 48. See ROBERTSON, supra note 25, § 7.01, at 7-3; see also MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK, supra 
note 19, at 11 (stating that a fund sponsor, historically, would market shares directly to the public, or 
indirectly, relying on “brokers, financial planners, life insurance companies, and banks,” and more 
recently, through a variety of other financial intermediaries). 
 49. See ROBERTSON, supra note 25, § 7.01 at 7-4. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See id. 
 52. Ellen E. Schultz, Bewildering Class Structure is Lurking in the Shadows of Mutual Fund 
Investing, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 1996, at C1. 
 53. Karen Damato, What to Ask Before Investing, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2004, at R1. 
 54. 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-1(b)(2) (2005).  These plans are referred to as 12b-1 distribution plans 
in reference to Rule 12b-1 of the Investment Company Act, which specifies the requirements for 
such plans.  See id. § 270.12b-1.  Approximately fifty-nine percent of mutual funds have adopted 
12b-1 distribution plans.  ROBERTSON, supra note 25, § 7.04, at 7-11.  Some funds do not use fund 
assets to market and sell shares.  Instead expenses relating thereto may be covered by the investment 
adviser and front-end or back-end loads.  Id. § 7.04, at 7-10, n.1. 
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III. INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT BACKGROUND 
The first United States mutual fund, the Massachusetts Investors 
Trust, was established in Boston, Massachusetts, in 1924.55  The fund 
quickly became a success—by the end of 1926 it had $3.3 million ($35.9 
million adjusted for inflation) in assets under management.56  In the wake 
of this success, numerous other funds were launched.57  However, 
following the stock market crash of 1929 and Great Depression in the 
early 1930s, it became apparent that “there were evils, abuses and 
deficiencies in the organization and operation of [the mutual fund] 
industry which needed to be ferreted out and dealt with in some manner 
which would restore public confidence in the industry.”58  Hence, in 
1935, Congress directed the SEC to study the mutual fund industry and 
report back with recommendations.59  By 1939, the SEC had submitted to 
Congress the final part of an exhaustive report entitled Report of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission on Investment Trusts and 
Investment Companies60 including a proposed bill providing for the 
federal registration and regulation of mutual funds, among other things.61  
Following extensive congressional hearings where mutual fund industry 
representatives vigorously opposed various sections of the bill, the SEC 
                                                     
 55. MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK, supra note 19, at 5; John C. Bogle, Re-Mutualizing the Mutual 
Fund Industry—The Alpha and the Omega, 45 B.C. L. REV. 391, 391 (2004). 
 56. Bogle, supra note 55, at 393. 
 57. Walter P. North, A Brief History of Federal Investment Company Legislation, 44 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 677, 678 (1969). 
 58. Id.  These abuses included the following: 
the promiscuous creation of investment companies where no economic need for them 
existed; the frequent lack of ability and experience on the part of sponsors or promoters 
of companies the chief appeal of which lay in the promise of expert security analysis and 
investment management; conflicts of interest in the sponsors, especially predominant 
groups of investment bankers, brokers, security dealers, and other professional financing 
groups; self-dealing; failure to make adequate disclosure to investors; complete and 
arbitrary control over the financial capital structure; failure by the sponsors to make 
capital contributions commensurate with the position and interests they obtained in the 
enterprise; failure by the sponsors to assume and live up to their fiduciary duties; and 
excessive compensation. 
Note, Regulation of Investment Companies, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 584, 588–89 (1940) (footnotes 
omitted).  See also Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 480 (1979) (“Congress was concerned about the 
potential for abuse inherent in the structure of investment companies.”); ROBERTSON, supra note 25, 
§ 1.02[1], at 1-42 to -44 (discussing legislative intent). 
 59. Burks, 441 U.S. at 480.  See also 1 FRANKEL & SCHWING, supra note 44, § 1.02[B], at 1-51 
(citing congressional charge to conduct the study); 1 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES 
REGULATION § 1-H-6, at 247 (3d ed. 1999), available in LEXIS Securities, Treatises & Analytical 
materials (citing the SEC study). 
 60. North, supra note 57, at 678.  The report was printed as H.R. DOC. NO. 707 (1938). 
 61. 1 FRANKEL & SCHWING, supra note 44, § 1.02[B], at 1-52. 
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worked with the industry to draft a substitute bill acceptable to both 
parties.62  Congress enacted this bill, with slight modifications, on 
August 22, 1940, as the Investment Company Act of 1940.63  The Act 
“expanded the disclosure provisions already applicable to [an investment 
company] under the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, and imposed specific requirements as to the structure and 
operations of mutual funds.”64 
Section 7(a) of the ICA requires that investment companies register 
with the SEC.65  The definition of investment company includes any 
company that “is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or 
proposes to engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or 
trading in securities.”66  Obviously, a mutual fund falls under this 
definition because it solicits investors to pool their money to invest in 
securities.67  The ICA classifies an investment company as either a face-
amount certificate company,68 a unit investment trust,69 or a management 
company.70  The ICA then subclassifies a management company as either 
an open-end investment company or a closed-end investment company.71  
These distinctions are relevant because certain provisions of the ICA 
apply only to certain classes or subclasses of investment companies.72  A 
                                                     
 62. ROBERTSON, supra note 25, § 1.02[3], at 1-55. 
 63. Pub. L. No. 768, 54 Stat. 789 (1940).  See also ROBERTSON, supra note 25, § 1.02[3], at 1-
55 (citing 54 Stat. 789). 
 64. Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 406 (2d Cir. 1977) (citations omitted). 
 65. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-7(a) (2000).  See generally 1 FRANKEL & SCHWING, supra note 44, § 
24.01, at 24-5 (stating that investment companies are required to register). 
 66. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(A) (2000).  A face-amount security company is an investment 
company that issues debt securities investors purchase in installments.  15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(15) 
(2000).  Face-amount certificate companies are almost extinct.  See 1 FRANKEL & SCHWING, supra 
note 44, § 5.08[A], at 5-186. 
 67. See supra text accompanying note 19. 
 68. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-4(1) (2000). 
 69. § 80a-4(2).  A unit investment trust (UIT) buys and holds a generally fixed portfolio of 
securities such as stocks and bonds.  MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK, supra note 19, at 12.  An investor 
in a UIT purchases units in the trust and is entitled to a proportionate share of dividends and interest 
paid on investments in the trust portfolio.  Id. 
 70. § 80a-4(3). 
 71. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a) (2000).  The ICA defines a closed-end investment company as “any 
management company other than an open-end company.”  § 80a-5(a)(2).  The ICA defines an open-
end investment company as “a management company which is offering for sale or has outstanding 
any redeemable security of which it is the issuer.”  § 80a-5(a)(1).  Hence, a closed-end investment 
company is a management company that does not issue redeemable shares.  1 FRANKEL & SCHWING, 
supra note 44, § 5.08[C][1], at 5-200.  Thus, the number of shares a closed-end investment company 
has outstanding is typically fixed.  MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK, supra note 19, at 12.  If an investor 
wishes to cash out of a closed-end investment company it has to sell its shares to a third party 
because the fund is under no obligation to redeem shares.  Id.  Consequently, shares of closed-end 
investment companies trade on stock exchanges and in the over-the-counter market.  Id. 
 72. LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 59, § 1-H-6a, at 242–43. 
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mutual fund is technically an open-end investment company because it 
issues redeemable shares to investors.73  This means that an investor can 
cash out of a mutual fund by simply requesting that the fund redeem the 
investor’s shares.74  The fund is required to do so at a per-share price 
based on the then-current value of the fund’s net assets.75 
Once registered, an investment company is subject to the various 
regulatory provisions of the ICA.76  These provisions are designed to 
address five primary areas: sales practices, investment advisory fees, 
fund management, fund capital structures, and financial statements and 
accounting.77  For example, section 22(b) of the ICA addresses excessive 
sales loads;78 section 36(b) provides that the investment adviser of an 
investment company owes the investment company “a fiduciary duty 
with respect to the receipt of compensation for services, or of payments 
of a material nature, paid by such registered investment company;”79 
section 13 prohibits an investment company from changing its stated 
investment policies unless authorized by a majority vote of its 
shareholders;80 section 18 generally prohibits an open-end company from 
issuing any senior securities;81 and section 30 requires investment 
companies to furnish semi-annual financial statements to shareholders 
and empowers the SEC to promulgate uniform accounting rules for 
investment companies.82 
Under the ICA, at least forty percent of the directors on a fund’s 
board must not be “interested persons” of the fund.83  In general terms, 
“interested persons” include fund insiders, members of their immediate 
families, insiders of the fund’s investment adviser, and insiders of the 
                                                     
 73. The statutory scheme is as follows: The Investment Company Act defines a management 
company as “any investment company other than a face-amount certificate company or a unit 
investment trust.”  15 U.S.C. § 80a-4(3).  An open-end investment company is “a management 
company which is offering for sale or has outstanding any redeemable security of which it is the 
issuer.”  § 80a-5(a)(1).  A redeemable security is “any security, other than short-term paper, under 
the terms of which the holder, upon its presentation to the issuer or to a person designated by the 
issuer, is entitled (whether absolutely or only out of surplus) to receive approximately his 
proportionate share of the issuer’s current net assets, or the cash equivalent thereof.”  15 U.S.C. § 
80a-2(a)(32) (2000). 
 74. See MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK, supra note 19, at 12 (discussing liquidity of mutual fund 
shares). 
 75. Id. 
 76. 1 FRANKEL & SCHWING, supra note 44, § 24.01 at 24-5. 
 77. See generally LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 59, at § 1-H-6. 
 78. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(b) (2000). 
 79. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2000). 
 80. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-13(a)(3) (2000). 
 81. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(f) (2000). 
 82. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-30 (2000). 
 83. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (2000). 
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fund’s principal underwriter.84  Directors who are not interested persons 
of a fund are generally referred to as independent directors.85  Currently, 
if a fund relies on certain exemptive rules under the ICA (which is the 
case for most funds), at least a majority of the fund’s directors must be 
independent.86  As a result of rules recently adopted by the SEC, this 
majority requirement is scheduled to be increased to seventy-five percent 
in December 2006.87 
The ICA “assigns a host of special responsibilities”88 to a fund’s 
independent directors, including annually approving the fund’s advisory 
contract and principal underwriting agreement,89 annually selecting the 
fund’s independent accountant, approving any 12b-1 distribution plan 
(concurrently with the fund’s full board),90 and adopting procedures for 
transactions with affiliated funds and determining compliance therewith 
quarterly (concurrently with the fund’s full board).91  The Supreme Court 
has characterized the role of independent fund directors as “independent 
watchdogs” for the interests of fund shareholders.92  No types of business 
entities are statutorily required to have independent directors other than 
investment companies registered under the ICA.93 
Finally, as noted above, section 36(a) provides a general fiduciary 
duty applicable to officers, directors, investment advisers, and principal 
underwriters of investment companies.  This duty has been characterized 
as a “reservoir of fiduciary obligations” available to deal with 
misconduct that is not specifically addressed in the ICA.94  Specifically, 
section 36(a) of the ICA provides as follows: 
                                                     
 84. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19) (2000).  See also ROBERTSON, supra note 25, § 3.03[4], at 3-16 & 
17. 
 85. Id. § 3.03[1], at 3-12. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Investment Company Governance Release, supra note 15, at *17.  See also 17 C.F.R. § 
270.0-1(a)(7) (2005); ROBERTSON, supra note 25, § 3.03[1], at 3-13.  I say it is “scheduled” to be 
increased to seventy-five percent and not that it “will” be increased because a federal appellate court 
recently found that, in adopting the rule, the SEC violated the Administrative Procedure Act and 
remanded the matter to the SEC for further consideration.  Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 
133, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 88. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 486 (1979). 
 89. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (2000). 
 90. Id. 
 91. 17 C.F.R. § 270.17a-7(e) (2005).  See also ROBERTSON, supra note 25,  § 3.01, at 3-4 to -5. 
 92. See Burks, 441 U.S. at 482–83. 
 93. ROBERTSON, supra note 25, § 3.01, at 3-3. 
 94. Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1141–42 (5th Cir. 1979) (quoting Brown v. Bullock, 194 
F. Supp. 207, 238–39 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff’d, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961)), aff’d, 450 U.S. 91 
(1981); Strougo v. Scudder, Stevens & Clark, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 783, 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (same). 
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The [SEC] is authorized to bring an action in the proper district court of 
the United States, or in the United States court of any territory or other 
place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, alleging that a 
person serving or acting in one or more of the following capacities has 
engaged within five years of the commencement of the action or is 
about to engage in any act or practice constituting a breach of fiduciary 
duty involving personal misconduct in respect of any registered 
investment company for which such person so serves or acts— 
 (1) as officer, director, member of any advisory board, investment 
adviser, or depositor; or 
 (2)  as principal underwriter, if such registered company is an 
open-end company, unit investment trust, or face-amount 
certificate company.95 
Section 36(a) does not provide for an express private cause of action.  
Courts, however, have recognized an implied private cause of action.96 
Obviously, in a section 36(a) action by either the SEC or a private 
party, the meaning of “a breach of fiduciary duty involving personal 
misconduct” is key.  This language raises two interpretive issues.  First, 
what fiduciary duties do the enumerated parties owe to an investment 
company?  Second, what sort of breach “involves personal misconduct”?  
Each of these issues is discussed in detail below. 
IV. “BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY” UNDER SECTION 36(A) 
Implicit in the language of section 36(a) is a recognition by Congress 
that the officers, directors, investment adviser, and principal underwriter 
of an investment company owe the company fiduciary duties.97  
Otherwise, section 36(a) would be superfluous; i.e., if no fiduciary duties 
are owed, it makes no sense to prohibit their breach.  As Justice 
Frankfurter noted in SEC v. Chenery Corp., to conclude that one party 
owes another party fiduciary duties “gives direction to further 
inquiry. . . .  What obligations does [the party] owe as a fiduciary?”98  
The ICA is silent on this issue with respect to section 36(a). 
                                                     
 95. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (2000). 
 96. See FRANKEL & SCHWING, supra note 44, § 34.03, at 36-48 to -49 (“Substantially all courts 
now agree that section 36(a) does support an implied private right of action for breach of fiduciary 
duty involving personal misconduct in violation of section 36(a).”). 
 97. See Tannenbaum v. Zellar, 552 F.2d 402, 416 (2d Cir. 1977) (stating that section 36 
“established a federal standard of fiduciary duty in dealings between a mutual fund and its adviser”); 
Fogel v. Chestnutt, 533 F.2d 731, 745 (2d Cir. 1975) (stating that the ICA “implicitly established a 
federal standard of fiduciary duty in respect of dealings between a mutual fund and its adviser”). 
 98. 318 U.S. 80, 85 (1943). 
SJOSTROM FINAL.DOC 2/21/2006  9:56:32 AM 
2005] TAPPING THE RESERVOIR 263 
A. Legislative History and Case Law 
The legislative history of section 36(a) provides only limited 
guidance as to what fiduciary duties are owed.  As originally enacted, the 
standard for a violation of section 36 was “gross misconduct or gross 
abuse of trust.”99  In 1970, however, Congress amended section 36 to 
change this standard to the current “breach of fiduciary duty involving 
personal misconduct” standard.100  According to the Senate Committee 
report on the underlying bill, the change was necessary because “the 
highly punitive overtones of the existing section, together with the 
injunctive penalty, seriously impairs the ability of the courts to deal 
flexibly and adequately with wrongdoing by certain affiliated persons of 
investment companies.”101  The report also stated that the standard 
encompassed “conduct which violates prevailing standards of fiduciary 
duty involving personal misconduct.”102  Because there are no other 
relevant portions of legislative history on this issue from the 1970 
amendment, all the legislative history tells us is that in the opinion of the 
Senate Committee, the duties owed are something greater than refraining 
from engaging in gross misconduct or gross abuse of trust, and they 
encompass fiduciary duties prevailing in 1970. 
The courts have not provided much guidance either.  Only a handful 
of cases address in any detail the issue of what fiduciary duties are owed 
for purposes of section 36(a).  Three early circuit court decisions, Moses 
v. Burgin,103 Fogel v. Chestnutt,104 and Tannenbaum v. Zeller,105 explore 
the issue.  Each of these cases arose out of the alleged failure of mutual 
funds to “recapture” a portion of commissions paid by the funds to 
securities brokers for executing trades for the funds’ portfolios.  At the 
time, the securities exchanges set brokerage commissions and disallowed 
discounts and rebates.106  Because mutual funds engaged in large and 
frequent trades generating large and frequent brokerage commissions, 
brokers coveted their business.107  Hence, to land the business, brokers 
were willing to work around the anti-rebate rules by allowing so-called 
                                                     
 99. Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, § 36, 54 Stat. 841, 841 (1940). 
 100. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 36, 84 Stat. 1413, 
1429 (1970). 
 101. S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 36 (1969) [hereinafter Senate Report]. 
 102. Id. 
 103. 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971). 
 104. 533 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 105. 552 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 106. See Moses, 445 F.2d at 372 (discussing prevention of direct cash refunds to the customer). 
 107. Id. 
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customer-directed give-ups.108  Under this system, a fund’s investment 
adviser would direct a trade-executing broker to pay a portion of the 
resulting brokerage commission, “sometimes as much as 75%,”109 to a 
broker who, for example, had sold shares of the fund to investors.110  
This would reduce or eliminate the amount the adviser-underwriter had 
to pay to this second broker as compensation for selling fund shares.111 
According to the 1966 SEC report, Public Policy Implications of 
Investment Company Growth (PPI),112 four adviser-underwriters, through 
the use of broker subsidiaries, were able to recapture these give-ups for 
the benefit of the fund without running afoul of the anti-rebate rules.113  
The report also stated that “[u]nder existing commission rate structures, 
mutual fund shareholders could derive greater benefits from their 
brokerage commissions if the give-up portions of the commissions were 
transmitted to the funds themselves or their adviser-underwriters for the 
purpose of reducing management costs.”114  This revelation spawned a 
large number of shareholder derivative suits brought on behalf of mutual 
funds that were not recapturing give-ups for the benefit of their funds 
against directors, investment advisers, and underwriters of the funds.115 
Moses involved a shareholder derivative action against directors and 
officers of the mutual fund Fidelity Fund, Inc., and the fund’s investment 
adviser and underwriter.116  The plaintiff asserted that Fidelity “could, 
and should, have recovered a portion of the brokerage commissions it 
was obliged to pay.”117  Because it did not, the plaintiff claimed that the 
defendants were liable under ICA section 36.118  Specifically, the 
plaintiff claimed that the fund’s board never considered possible methods 
to recapture commissions “because relevant information regarding them 
was improperly withheld from the unaffiliated directors by the 
Management defendants.”119  The trial court dismissed the claim, finding 
that the fund directors based their decision not to pursue recapture on 
                                                     
 108. Id. 
 109. Fogel, 533 F.2d at 735. 
 110. Moses, 445 F.2d at 372. 
 111. Fogel, 533 F.2d at 735. 
 112. H.R. REP. NO. 89-2337 (1966). 
 113. Id. at 172–73. 
 114. Id. at 16. 
 115. Fogel, 533 F.2d at 734. 
 116. Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369, 371 (1st Cir. 1971). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 372.  Although the case was decided in 1971, because the litigation was commenced 
prior to the 1970 amendment to ICA section 36, the case involved the pre-1970 version of section 
36.  See id. at 373. 
 119. Id. at 372. 
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“sound business and legal reasons”120 and therefore were not in breach of 
any fiduciary duty.121 
The First Circuit disagreed.122  The court noted that one of the 
primary reasons Congress enacted the ICA was because of inherent 
conflicts of interests in the structure of investment companies.123  
According to the court, the ICA responded to this problem by requiring 
that investment company boards include “unaffiliated, that is, 
independent, watchdog directors.”124  Hence, the court concluded that the 
fund’s adviser and fund directors affiliated with the adviser “were under 
a duty of full disclosure of information to these unaffiliated directors in 
every area where there was even a possible conflict of interest between 
their interests and the interests of the fund.”125  The court further stated, 
Except where it may be fairly assumed that every unaffiliated director 
will have such knowledge, effective communication is called for.  And, 
in testing that assumption, it must be borne in mind that they are not 
full time employees of the fund and it may be—as with Fund’s 
unaffiliated directors—that neither their activities nor their experience 
are primarily connected with the special and often technical problems 
of fund operation.  If management does not keep these directors 
informed they will not be in a position to exercise the independent 
judgment that Congress clearly intended.  The only question can be 
whether the matter is one that could be thought to be of possible 
significance.126 
Here, the court found that the adviser and affiliated directors were 
aware of the recapture issue, “that they knew it to be in an area where 
there was a conflict between their personal interests and the direct 
interests of the [f]und treasury, and that they did not inform the 
                                                     
 120. Moses v. Burgin, 316 F. Supp. 31, 44 (D. Mass. 1970), rev’d, 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971). 
 121. See id. at 55. 
 122. 445 F.2d at 377. 
 123. Id. at 376. 
 124. Id.  As enacted in 1940, the ICA required that at least “40% of the directors on a fund’s 
board be ‘unaffiliated’ with the fund” or the fund’s investment adviser.  See ROBERTSON, supra note 
25, § 3.02, at 3-8.  An unaffiliated director includes a person who is not an officer or employee of the 
fund, in a control relationship with the fund, or an investment adviser of the fund.  15 U.S.C. § 80a-
2(a)(3) (2000).  See also ROBERTSON, supra note 25, § 3.03[4], at 3-17 to -18.  In 1970, the ICA was 
amended to change the unaffiliated director requirement to an independent director requirement.  See 
id. § 3.02, at 3-8.  The concept of independent director is stricter than the concept of unaffiliated 
director; it excludes affiliates of the fund as well as affiliates of the fund’s investment adviser and 
members of their immediate families.  See supra text accompanying notes 83–85 for a discussion of 
the definition of independent director. 
 125. Moses, 445 F.2d at 376. 
 126. Id. at 377. 
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unaffiliated directors or submit it to their consideration.”127  Thus, the 
court concluded that the adviser and affiliated directors breached this 
disclosure duty and were therefore liable under ICA section 36.128  The 
court concluded, however, that the unaffiliated directors were not liable 
because there was no evidence that they had knowledge of the possibility 
of recapture, a conflict of interest in the matter, or a duty to discover and 
explore the issue on their own.129 
Fogel involved a shareholder derivative action by two shareholders 
of the mutual fund American Investors Fund against the fund’s 
investment adviser and four fund directors affiliated with the investment 
adviser.130  In accordance with Moses, the plaintiffs alleged that the 
defendants breached fiduciary duties owed to the fund by failing to 
inform the fund’s independent directors of the possibility of recapture.131  
The Second Circuit adopted the duty of disclosure articulated by the First 
Circuit in Moses.132 
In the case, the defendants asserted that the unaffiliated directors 
were aware of the recapture issue and had been sent a copy of the PPI but 
were opposed to establishing the requisite broker subsidiary to enable 
recapture.133  The court found, however, that there had been ineffective 
communication of the issue to the unaffiliated directors largely because 
Stanley Sabel, an affiliated director of the fund and general counsel of 
the adviser, incorrectly advised the fund’s directors that the SEC’s 
recommendations about recapture did not apply to the fund.134  The court 
thus concluded that the affiliated directors were liable for breach of the 
Moses duty to disclose.135  The court stated, 
The minimum requirement to enable the Fund’s independent directors 
to discharge these [disclosure] duties with respect to recapture was a 
careful investigation of the possibilities performed with an eye eager to 
discern them rather than shut against them, and, if these possibilities 
were found to be real, a weighing of their legal difficulties and their 
economic pros and cons.  It would have been still better to have the 
investigation of recapture methods and their legal consequences 
performed by disinterested counsel furnished to the independent 
                                                     
 127. Id. at 378. 
 128. Id. at 384. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Fogel v. Chestnutt, 533 F.2d 731, 737 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 131. Id. at 744. 
 132. Id. at 745. 
 133. Id. at 748–49. 
 134. Id. at 749. 
 135. Id. at 750. 
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directors.  If this had been done and the independent directors had 
concluded that, because of legal doubts, business considerations or 
both, the Fund should make no effort at recapture, we would have a 
different case.136 
Tannenbaum involved a shareholder derivative action by a 
shareholder of the mutual fund Chemical Fund Inc. against the fund’s 
investment adviser and the vice-chairman of the fund’s board of 
directors.137  The plaintiff alleged that “the defendants breached their 
fiduciary duties to the Fund in their dealings with the independent 
directors regarding recapture.”138  The court noted that section 36 
“established a federal standard of fiduciary duty in dealings between a 
mutual fund and its adviser”139 and that these duties were “at least as 
stringent as those at common law.”140  The court then reviewed the 
Moses and Fogel decisions and agreed that ICA section 36 imposed a 
duty to disclose.141  The court described the duties of fund directors in the 
recapture context as follows: 
[T]he decision to forego recapture here did not violate the fiduciary 
obligations of either the Fund’s adviser or directors under section 36 of 
the Investment Company Act if the independent directors (1) were not 
dominated or unduly influenced by the investment adviser; (2) were 
fully informed by the adviser and interested directors of the possibility 
of recapture and the alternative uses of brokerage; and (3) fully aware 
of this information, reached a reasonable business decision to forego 
recapture after a thorough review of all relevant factors.142 
The court applied these three prongs to the case at bar and concluded 
that all three prongs were met.143  Specifically, the court found that: 
[t]here was full disclosure by the Fund’s adviser as to the possibilities 
of recapture and the methods available to accomplish it.  All material 
dealing with the question was placed before the independent directors 
and fully considered by them.  They were correctly advised by counsel 
as to the applicable legal standards.  They carefully weighed the 
relative advantages and disadvantages of recapture and the economic 
 
                                                     
 136. Id. at 749–50 (footnote omitted). 
 137. Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 404, 411 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 138. Id. at 413. 
 139. Id. at 416. 
 140. Id. at 416 n.20. 
 141. Id. at 418. 
 142. Id. at 418–19. 
 143. Id. at 428. 
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pros and cons involved.  Their decision to forego recapture was a 
reasonable business judgment.144 
Hence, the court found that the defendants did not violate ICA section 
36.145 
In the 1980 case Cambridge Fund, Inc. v. Abella,146 the court 
extended the Moses-Fogel-Tannenbaum line of cases.  In the case, 
Cambridge Fund, Inc., brought an action to recover amounts paid by the 
fund to University Management Corporation; its adviser, Frank Abella, 
an affiliated director of the fund; and Robert Fredricks, an unaffiliated 
director of the fund, in indemnifying University Management and Abella 
for legal expenses they incurred in connection with an SEC 
investigation.147  The court reviewed Moses, Fogel, and Tannebaum and 
held that the duty to disclose articulated in that line of cases extended 
beyond the recapture issue.148  Hence, the court held that University 
Management and Abella “had a similar duty of disclosure with respect to 
the Fund’s payment of their legal expenses” because the situation 
involved potential conflicts of interest.149  The court found that 
University Management and Abella breached this duty with respect to 
the indemnification issue because information relating thereto “was 
presented by [University] Management and Abella in such a one-sided 
and incomplete manner that it discouraged any meaningful, independent 
evaluation of the indemnification request by the unaffiliated directors.”150  
The court also held that Fredricks could be liable either if he was on 
notice of the issue and failed to explore it on his own, or if after his 
independent and thorough review of the issue he “failed to exercise 
reasonable business judgment” in deciding how to respond.151  The court 
found that Fredricks was not liable under this standard.152 
The fund also sought to recover from Abella for personally trading in 
securities that the fund was also trading.153  With respect to this claim, 
the court held “that defendant Abella had, under [s]ection 36(a) of the 
                                                     
 144. Id. at 428–29. 
 145. Id. at 429. 
 146. 501 F. Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
 147. Id. at 601. 
 148. Id. at 623. 
 149. Id. at 622. 
 150. Id. at 625. 
 151. Id. at 623 (citing Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 418 (2d Cir. 1977); Moses v. 
Burgin, 445 F.2d 369, 384 (1st Cir. 1971)). 
 152. Id. at 627. 
 153. Id. at 625. 
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[Investment Company] Act, a duty to disclose to the independent 
directors any trading he did in securities being traded in simultaneously 
by the investment company.”154  The court based this holding on 
legislative history of the ICA that indicated a congressional concern with 
respect to simultaneous trading by a director and a fund.155  The court 
also based its holding on “the recognition that the independent directors 
were intended to be ‘independent watchdogs’ and that therefore full 
effective and neutral disclosure must be made to them as to all issues 
relating to the management of the fund or its assets and as to which there 
are potential conflicts of interest.”156  The court found that Abella did not 
knowingly breach this disclosure duty, reasoning that Abella’s failure to 
disclose his simultaneous trading resulted from his belief that his trading 
did not give rise to conflicts of interest because the trades involved only 
a few hundred shares.157 
In addition to the above line of cases with respect to the duty to 
disclose, a handful of cases touch on exactly what fiduciary duties are 
owed under ICA section 36(a).  The Seventh Circuit mentioned the issue 
in the 1972 case, SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp.158  In this case, 
the SEC alleged, among other things, that two directors of Advance 
Growth, an investment company, violated section 36 of the ICA when 
they caused Advance Growth to engage in “certain allegedly improper 
transactions with affiliated companies.”159  Because the SEC initiated the 
litigation prior to the 1970 amendments to section 36, the district court 
applied the old “gross misconduct or gross abuse of trust” standard and 
found no violation by the directors.160  The Seventh Circuit affirmed the 
district court on this point.161  In doing so, it acknowledged in a footnote 
that the standard under section 36 had changed since commencement of 
the case and stated that “[w]e are aware . . . that the provisions of the 
[ICA] impose fiduciary obligations of the highest order upon persons 
who control investment companies.”162 
                                                     
 154. Id. at 623. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 624. 
 157. Id. at 628. 
 158. 470 F.2d 40, 54–55 n.21 (7th Cir. 1972). 
 159. Id. at 45. 
 160. Id. at 54. 
 161. Id. at 54–55. 
 162. Id. at 55 n.21. 
SJOSTROM FINAL.DOC 2/21/2006  9:56:32 AM 
270 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54 
In the 1975 case Gafland v. Chestnutt,163 a shareholder brought a 
derivative action against the mutual fund American Investors Fund.164  
The suit alleged, among other things, that an affiliated director of the 
fund improperly influenced the other fund directors to approve 
increasing the funds expense ratio.165  In ruling in favor of the plaintiff, 
the court mentioned in dicta that “[t]he directors of the Fund held a 
position of trust and confidence with respect to the Fund’s shareholders, 
and owed them the obligations commonly associated with fiduciaries.”166  
The court also stated “that the applicable standard of fiduciary duty was a 
matter of federal law incorporating wherever appropriate equitable 
safeguards long known to the common law.”167 
In the 1996 case Seidel v. Lee,168 plaintiff, a shareholder of ML-Lee 
Acquisition Fund, L.P., brought a class action suit against the fund, its 
investment adviser, underwriter, administrator, and general partners 
alleging, among other things, that the defendants violated ICA section 
36(a) by recommending or approving allegedly unlawful transactions 
engaged in by the fund.169  In overruling a motion to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim, the court held that “[r]ecommending or approving a 
transaction without determining if it is a proper transaction would clearly 
be a breach of the [general partner’s] fiduciary duties.”170 
In the 2001 case, Goldstein v. Lincoln National Convertible 
Securities Fund, Inc., the plaintiff brought an action against the fund and 
its board of directors to set aside the election of directors.171  The plaintiff 
claimed that the defendants breached fiduciary duties owed under section 
36(a) and state law “by enforcing an invalid advance notice deadline for 
submission of shareholder nominations and proposals and inequitably 
interfering with the shareholders’ right to vote for directors.”172  The 
court stated that ICA section 36(a) “imposes a federal standard for 
fiduciary obligations owed to shareholders by directors and other officers 
of mutual funds.”173  It then quoted the Tannenbaum court’s statement 
                                                     
 163. 402 F. Supp. 1318 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev’d in part sub nom. Galfand v. Chestnutt Corp., 545 
F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 164. Id. at 1321. 
 165. Id. at 1322. 
 166. Id. at 1328. 
 167. Id. 
 168. No. 94-422-JJF, 1996 WL 903947 (D. Del. Aug. 16, 1996). 
 169. Id. at *8. 
 170. Id. 
 171. 140 F. Supp. 2d 424, 428 (E.D. Pa. 2001), vacated in part, No. 01-2259, 2003 WL 1846095 
(3d Cir. Apr. 2, 2003). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 436. 
SJOSTROM FINAL.DOC 2/21/2006  9:56:32 AM 
2005] TAPPING THE RESERVOIR 271 
that the fiduciary duties owed under ICA section 36(a) are “‘at least as 
stringent as those at common law’”174 and the reference in the legislative 
history of ICA section 36(a) to “‘prevailing standard of fiduciary duty 
involving personal misconduct.’”175  The court, however, did not address 
the section 36(a) claim because Congress relied on “prevailing 
standards” and the parties did not brief the issue of whether the 
defendants violated section 36(a).176  Instead, it addressed the breach of 
fiduciary duty claim under state law.177 
Summing up the limited case law on the issue, section 36(a) imposes 
a federal standard of fiduciary duties.  These duties are at least as 
stringent as those under common law and, at least according to one court, 
are of the highest order.  These duties include an obligation by a fund’s 
investment adviser and affiliated directors to make full disclosure to the 
fund’s unaffiliated directors with respect to issues that involve a potential 
conflict of interest between the adviser and the fund.  These duties also 
include an obligation by a fund’s unaffiliated directors, if on notice of a 
potential conflict-of-interest issue, to investigate the issue.  Finally, a 
decision by unaffiliated directors with respect to a potential conflict-of-
interest issue must constitute a reasonable business judgment. 
B. Need for Further Development 
Obviously, the section 36(a) fiduciary duty standard is not well 
defined.  In light of the mutual fund scandal and attendant flood of 
litigation, it needs further development.  Clarification is not necessarily 
needed for a section 36(a) claim against an investment adviser that 
engaged in the type of conduct described by Spitzer in his complaint 
against Canary.  An investment adviser that has knowingly allowed 
traders to engage in late trading and market timing in exchange for 
indirect payments to the adviser has breached a fiduciary duty to the fund 
regardless of whether the duty is defined broadly or narrowly. 
But what about less egregious or merely questionable mutual fund 
behavior?  Examples abound.  Take the common practice by advisers of 
charging funds marketing and distribution fees that are used in part for 
advertising and promotional materials to attract new investors.178  The 
                                                     
 174. Id. (quoting Tannenbuam v. Zeller, 552 F.2d, 402, 416 n.20 (2d Cir. 1977)). 
 175. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 90-3724, at 34 (1968)).  See also text accompanying note 102. 
 176. Id. at 436–37. 
 177. Id. at 437. 
 178. See Pui-Wing Tam, Some Closed Funds Charge for Marketing, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1998, 
at C1 (explaining practice of 12b-1 fee). 
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thinking goes that because of economies of scale, attracting more assets 
lowers the expenses paid as a percentage of assets by the fund and thus 
benefits all fund shareholders.179  Funds can become too big, and hence 
many funds close to new investors before reaching this point.180  Some of 
these funds, however, continue to be charged the maximum possible 
marketing and distribution fees by their investment advisers.181  Critics 
contend that this is inappropriate.182  But, more importantly, have a fund 
board and adviser breached section 36(a) if they allow a closed fund to 
continue to be charged the maximum possible marketing fees?  As 
another example, consider the number of mutual fund directorships held 
by a person.  Outside of the mutual fund industry, it is rare for a person 
to serve on the board of more than ten corporations.183  Critics assert that 
even ten is too many because “individuals serving on too many boards 
lack time to adequately monitor a company’s management, especially 
during tough times.”184  In the mutual fund industry, it is not uncommon 
for an individual to serve on a hundred or more boards.185  For example, 
The Wall Street Journal reported in March 2004 that Marvin Mann, the 
former chairman of a printer manufacturer, served on 292 mutual fund 
boards.186  Does an individual breach section 36(a) by serving on 
hundreds of mutual fund boards?  Another example is the common 
practice of a fund’s adviser hiring a sub-adviser to manage the fund’s 
portfolio.  In this situation, it is typical for the sub-adviser to agree to a 
breakpoint fee arrangement.187  If these fees end up being less than what 
the adviser charges the fund for portfolio management,188 has the adviser 
breached section 36(a)?  One last example: Brokers recently have been 
accused of pushing clients to buy class B mutual fund shares when class 
                                                     
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id.  See also Funds Charge Marketing Fees Though Portfolios Are Closed, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 5, 2003, at D2; Kara Scannell, Some Mutual-Fund Fees Face the Smell Test, WALL ST. J., Dec. 
16, 2003, at C1. 
 182. See Funds Charge Marketing Fees Though Portfolios Are Closed, supra note 181; 
Scannell, supra note 181; Tam, supra note 178. 
 183. See Joann S. Lublin, Multiple Seats of Power: Companies Are Cracking Down On Number 
of Directorships Board Members Can Hold, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2001, at B1 (explaining that 
public company investors have high expectations of board members). 
 184. Id. 
 185. See George Anders, Waking the Watchdog: As Scandals Mount, Boards of Mutual Funds 
Feel the Heat, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2004, at A1. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Tom Lauricella, Mutual Funds Pocket the Fees Even as Costs Decline, WALL ST. J., June 
11, 2004, at C1.  See ROBERTSON, supra note 25, § 6.02[2], at 6-5 to -6 and text accompanying 
notes 38–42 for a discussion of breakpoint fee arrangements. 
 188. See Lauricella, supra note 187. 
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A shares are more appropriate for the client.189  Some claim brokers do 
this because class B shares result in bigger commissions for the 
brokers.190  Assuming this is true, has a fund adviser breached section 
36(a) if it is aware that brokers are improperly pushing class B shares of 
the fund and does nothing to stop them? 
The ICA does not expressly prohibit any of the above practices, and 
from the perspective of the mutual fund industry there are likely 
legitimate reasons for engaging in all of them.  However, as mentioned 
above, section 36(a) has been characterized as a “reservoir of fiduciary 
obligations” available to deal with misconduct by officers, directors, 
investment advisers, and principal underwriters of investment companies 
not addressed by the ICA.191  Hence, one could certainly argue that these 
practices violate section 36(a).  Determining the circumstances under 
which any of these practices do or should constitute a violation of section 
36(a) is beyond the scope of this Article.  But at this point it should be 
obvious that additional guidance as to what constitutes a breach of 
fiduciary duty for purposes of section 36(a) is necessary, especially for 
the courts and attorneys dealing with the hundreds of lawsuits filed in the 
wake of the mutual fund scandal. 
C. Fiduciary Duties Under State Law 
So where does one turn for further guidance on defining the fiduciary 
duties owed under ICA section 36(a)?  Because there generally is no 
federal law of fiduciary duty,192 an obvious place is state law.  As 
mentioned above, each mutual fund is a separate legal entity organized 
under state law, typically as either a corporation or a business trust.193  
                                                     
 189. Jonathan Clements, Why Brokers Want You to Buy ‘B Shares’ and Other Questionable 
Investments, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2004, at D1.  See 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-1(b)(2) (2005); 
ROBERTSON, supra note 25, § 7.01, at 7-11; Damato, supra note 53; Shultz, supra note 52.  See also 
text accompanying notes 51–54 for a brief description of different classes of mutual fund shares. 
 190. Clements, supra note 189. 
 191. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 192. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478–79 (1977) (refusing to recognize a federal 
law of fiduciary duty). 
 193. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.  There are various considerations that drive the 
decision as to legal form, but in general “a business trust provides greater flexibility with respect to 
procedural matters and a corporation provides greater flexibility with respect to limitation of 
personal liability.”  Newman, supra note 25, at *5.  See also Victoria E. Schonfeld & Thomas M.J. 
Kerwin, Organization of a Mutual Fund, 49 BUS. LAW. 107, 114–16 (1993).  As of 1997, the split 
was approximately fifty-fifty between funds organized as corporations and funds organized as 
business trusts.  ROBERTSON, supra note 25, § 2.02, at 2-12.  As to jurisdiction, Maryland has 
emerged as the preferred jurisdiction for funds organized as corporations.  ROBERTSON, supra note 
25, § 2.02, at 2-13.  The reason for this popularity is that Maryland’s corporations statute contains 
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State corporate law imposes a well-developed body of fiduciary duties on 
directors of corporations,194 which a court could look to in defining 
fiduciary duties for purposes of ICA section 36(a).  This body of law is 
relevant not only to funds organized as corporations but also to those 
organized as business trusts.  This is because state courts have generally 
analogized the duties of trustees of business trusts to those of directors of 
corporations.195  The primary fiduciary duties owed by corporate 
directors under state law are the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.196  
Each is discussed below. 
1. Duty of Care 
Broadly speaking, “the duty of care requires that directors exercise 
the care that a person in a like position would exercise under similar 
circumstances.”197  For example, section 2-405.1 of the Maryland 
corporations statute entitled “Standard of Care Required of Directors” 
provides as follows: 
A director shall perform his duties as a director, including his duties as 
a member of a committee of the board on which he serves: 
 (1) In good faith; 
 (2) In a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests 
of the corporation; and 
 (3) With the care that an ordinary prudent person in a like position 
would use under similar circumstances.198 
This is a typical formulation patterned after the pre-1998 version of 
section 8.30 of the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), on which 
 
                                                                                                                       
 
various provisions specifically tailored for investment companies.  See Newman, supra note 25, at 
*5; Schonfeld & Kerwin, supra at 115–16.  A mutual fund organized as a business trust typically is 
established under the statutory trust laws of Delaware or the business trust laws of Massachusetts.  
Schonfeld & Kerwin, supra at 115–16. 
 194. See generally DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY 
DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS (5th ed. 1998). 
 195. See, e.g., Saminsky v. Abbot, 185 A.2d 765, 768 (Del. Ch. 1961); Richardson v. Clarke, 
364 N.E. 2d 804, 806–07 (Mass. 1977); see also Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 
264 (2d Cir. 1984) (“A board member’s obligation to a corporation and its shareholders has two 
prongs, generally characterized as the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.”); ROBERTSON, supra 
note 25, § 2.02[2], at 2-17. 
 196. BLOCK, supra note 194, at 1. 
 197. Id. at 109. 
 198. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-405.1(a) (LexisNexis 1999). 
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thirty-nine other jurisdictions have patterned their directors’ standard-of-
care statutory provisions.199 
The 1994 Corporate Director’s Guidebook put out by the Business 
Law Section of the American Bar Association elaborates on the various 
components of the above language: 
• in good faith—acting honestly; not to act, or cause the 
corporation to act, in an unlawful way; purporting to rely upon 
information that a director knows to be untrue will not be 
considered acting in good faith; 
• care—expressing the need to pay attention and to act 
diligently and reasonably; 
• ordinarily prudent person—incorporating the basic attributes 
of common sense, practical wisdom, and informed judgment; 
• in a like position—recognizing that the nature and extent of 
the corporate director’s role will vary depending upon such 
factors as the background and qualifications of the director, 
and the size, complexity, and location of the enterprise’s 
activities; 
• under similar circumstances—recognizing that the nature and 
extent of the oversight will vary, depending upon the 
corporation concerned and the factual situation presented; 
• reasonably believes—establishing that the standard of conduct 
is objective, not subjective; and 
• best interests of the corporation—emphasizing the corporate 
director’s primary allegiance to the corporation.200 
The role of a corporation’s board entails both decision-making and 
oversight functions.201  The decision-making function involves working 
with management to establish high-level corporate policy and strategic 
                                                     
 199. 2 MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT ANNOTATED § 8.30, at 8-177 (3d ed. 2000) 
[hereinafter MBCA ANNOTATED].  In 1998, MBCA section 8.30 was amended to provide: 
(a)  Each member of the board of directors, when discharging the duties of a director, 
shall act: (1) in good faith, and (2) in a manner the director reasonably believes to be 
in the best interest of the corporation. 
(b)  The members of the board of directors or a committee of the board, when becoming 
informed in connection with their decision-making function or devoting attention to 
their oversight function, shall discharge their duties with the care that a person in a 
like position would reasonably believe appropriate under similar circumstances. 
As of 2002, four states (Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, and Mississippi) had adopted amended section 8.30.  
Id. at 8-177. 
 200. Committee on Corporate Laws, Corporate Director’s Guidebook—1994 Edition, 49 BUS. 
LAW. 1243, 1252–53 (1994). 
 201. See Comm. on Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Bus. Law, Corporate Director’s 
Guidebook: Fourth Edition, 59 BUS. LAW. 1057, 1063 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 Director’s 
Guidebook]; see also 1 WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE 
OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 1.02 (7th ed. 2004). 
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goals as well as making decisions with respect to such matters as hiring 
senior management and setting executive compensation.202  The 
oversight function consists of ongoing monitoring of the corporation’s 
activities.203  It does not require directors to engage in “a detailed 
inspection of day-to-day activities, but rather a general monitoring of 
corporate affairs and policies.”204  The duty of care applies to both the 
decision-making and oversight functions.205 
The seminal case on the oversight function is the 1963 Delaware 
Supreme Court decision Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.206  
This case arose out of guilty pleas by Allis-Chalmers and four of its 
employees for violations of federal antitrust laws.207  In the case, 
plaintiffs brought a derivative suit against Allis-Chalmers’s directors to 
recover damages to it resulting from these guilty pleas.208  The plaintiffs 
alleged that the directors were liable because they failed “to take action 
designed to learn of and prevent anti-trust activity on the part of any 
employees of Allis-Chalmers.”209  The court found that the directors had 
no knowledge of the antitrust violations nor did they have reason to 
know.210  The court then rejected plaintiffs’ claim, stating that “absent 
cause for suspicion there is no duty upon the directors to install and 
operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which 
they have no reason to suspect exists.”211  The court did note, however, 
that if a director “has recklessly reposed confidence in an obviously 
untrustworthy employee, has refused or neglected cavalierly to perform 
his duty as a director, or has ignored either willfully or through 
inattention obvious danger signs of employee wrongdoing, the law will 
cast the burden of liability upon him.”212  The court found this not to be 
the case because the board addressed the situation promptly once it 
became aware of it.213 
                                                     
 202. See 2004 Director’s Guidebook, supra note 201, at 1063–64. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 822 (N.J. 1981) (citing Williams v. McKay, 
18 A. 824, 828 (N.J. Ch. 1889)). 
 205. See BLOCK, supra note 194, at 52 (stating that the duty of care applies to directors in the 
performance of their corporate duties). 
 206. 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963). 
 207. Id. at 127. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 129–30. 
 211. Id. at 130. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
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Chancellor Allen, a well-respected Delaware jurist,214 refined the 
duty of oversight as espoused in Allis-Chalmers in In re Caremark 
International Inc. Derivative Litigation.215  The opinion involved the 
Chancellor’s review of a proposed settlement of a derivative suit against 
Caremark’s board of directors.216  The derivative suit arose out of 
Caremark’s payment of approximately $250 million to various public 
and private parties under a plea agreement for alleged violations of 
federal and state laws by Caremark employees.217  The suit sought to 
recover this amount from the members of Caremark’s board of directors 
on grounds that the directors breached their duty of care to Caremark in 
connection with the situation.218  Specifically, the suit claimed “that the 
directors allowed a situation to develop and continue which exposed the 
corporation to enormous legal liability and that in so doing they violated 
a duty to be active monitors of corporate performance.”219 
In considering the merits of the claim, Chancellor Allen discussed 
Allis-Chalmers and concluded that the case should not be read broadly to 
mean “absent some ground giving rise to suspicion of violation of law, 
that corporate directors have no duty to assure that a corporate 
information gathering and reporting systems exists.”220  Instead, 
Chancellor Allen concluded that Allis-Chalmers “can be more narrowly 
interpreted as standing for the proposition that, absent grounds to suspect 
deception, neither corporate boards nor senior officers can be charged 
with wrongdoing simply for assuming the integrity of employees and the 
honesty of their dealings on the company’s behalf.”221  Hence, to satisfy 
the duty to be reasonably informed, the directors have an affirmative 
duty to assure themselves 
that information and reporting systems exist in the organization that are 
reasonably designed to provide to senior management and to the board 
itself timely, accurate information sufficient to allow management and 
the board, each within its scope, to reach informed judgments 
 
                                                     
 214. 1 DAVID A. DREXLER, ET AL., DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 15.06[1] 
(2004). 
 215. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 216. Id. at 960. 
 217. Id. at 960–61. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 967. 
 220. Id. at 969. 
 221. Id. (citing Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130–31 (Del. 1963)). 
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concerning both the corporation’s compliance with law and its business 
performance.222 
Chancellor Allen concluded that failure by the board to do so “under 
some circumstances may, in theory at least, render a director liable for 
losses caused by non-compliance with applicable legal standards.”223 
2. The Business-Judgment Rule and Raincoat Provisions 
Focusing on the duty of care in determining whether a bad decision 
by a director is actionable is misleading.  This is because a director who 
fails to comply with the duty of care will not necessarily be liable to the 
corporation or its shareholders for resulting damages.224  To recover 
damages, before even getting to whether a director breached his duty of 
care, the plaintiff must overcome the business-judgment rule and likely a 
so-called “raincoat” provision in the corporation’s articles or certificate 
of incorporation.225  Each of these hurdles is discussed below. 
The business-judgment rule is a presumption applied by courts in 
reviewing business decisions by corporate directors.  Under the rule, 
courts presume that decisions are made “on an informed basis, in good 
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best 
interests of the company.”226  If a director is sued by a shareholder or the 
corporation for a business decision allegedly made in breach of the 
director’s duty of care to the corporation, the court will examine the 
merits of the decision only if the plaintiff has proven facts that overcome 
the business-judgment rule presumption.  “When applied, this principle 
operates both as a procedural rule of evidence and a substantive rule of 
law, in that if the plaintiff fails to rebut the presumption that the directors 
acted in good faith, in the corporation’s best interest and on an informed 
basis, the business judgment standard protects both the directors and the 
decisions they make.”227  Put simply, unless the presumption is rebutted, 
                                                     
 222. Id. at 970. 
 223. Id. 
 224. BLOCK, supra note 194, at 109. 
 225. See id. at 225–26. 
 226. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. 
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).  See also Yost v. Early, 589  A.2d 1291, 1298 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1991) (quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812); BLOCK, supra note 194, at 5. 
 227. 2 MBCA ANNOTATED, supra note 199, § 8.31 official cmt. at 8-197 to -98.  See also Citron 
v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989) (explaining the rule and citing 
cases applying it). 
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courts will not second guess business decisions by corporate directors, 
even if the decision proved disastrous.228 
Courts have fashioned various formulations as to what a plaintiff 
must plead and prove to rebut the business-judgment rule presumption.229  
For example, in the 1982 opinion, Joy v. North, the court stated that the 
presumption would be overcome if the plaintiff proved that the 
“corporate decision lacks a business purpose, is tainted by a conflict of 
interest, is so egregious as to amount to a no-win decision, or results 
from an obvious and prolonged failure to exercise oversight or 
supervision.”230  More recently, in its 2003 opinion In re Walt Disney 
Company Derivative Litigation, the Delaware Chancery Court stated as 
follows: 
Plaintiffs may rebut the presumption that the board’s decision is 
entitled to deference by raising a reason to doubt whether the 
board’s action was taken on an informed basis or whether the 
directors honestly and in good faith believed that the action was 
in the best interests of the corporation.  Thus, plaintiffs must 
plead particularized facts sufficient to raise (1) a reason to doubt 
that the action was taken honestly and in good faith or (2) a 
reason to doubt that the board was adequately informed in 
making the decision.231 
The rationale behind the business-judgment rule is based on five 
grounds.232  First, everyone makes mistakes, including well-intentioned, 
informed directors.  The business-judgment rule, however, in the great 
majority of cases, prevents a court from second guessing with the benefit 
of hindsight a decision that turned out to be a mistake.  Hence, the rule 
“encourages competent individuals to become directors who otherwise 
might decline for fear of personal liability.”233 
Second, building a successful business entails taking risks.  
“[B]ecause potential profit often corresponds to the potential risk, it is 
very much in the interest of shareholders that the law not create 
incentives for overly cautious corporate decisions.”234  Hence, because 
the business-judgment rule generally shields directors from personal 
                                                     
 228. See 1 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 201, § 2.07, at 2-17 to -18. 
 229. Id. § 2.10, at 2-25. 
 230. 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). 
 231. 825 A.2d 275, 286 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 232. BLOCK, supra note 194, at 12. 
 233. Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. UAL Corp., 717 F. Supp. 575, 582 (N.D. Ill. 1989).  See also 
BLOCK, supra note 194, at 12. 
 234. Joy, 692 F.2d at 886. 
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liability, it allows them to “honestly assess risk and reward and accept 
for the corporation the highest risk adjusted returns available that are 
above the firm’s cost of capital.”235  Essentially, it takes out of the 
equation director concerns about personal liability if the decision turns 
out poorly. 
Third, most courts do not have the business expertise to evaluate the 
merits of a decision.236  Hence, the business-judgment rule appropriately 
prevents the courts from reviewing the merits of most business decisions.  
“[D]irectors are, in most cases, more qualified to make business 
decisions than are judges.”237  Further, courts have acknowledged that the 
courtroom is a less-than-ideal setting to evaluate a business decision.238  
This is because “[t]he circumstances surrounding a corporate decision 
are not easily reconstructed in a courtroom years later, since business 
imperatives often call for quick decisions, inevitably based on less than 
perfect information.”239  Therefore, “a reasoned decision at the time 
made may seem a wild hunch viewed years later against a background of 
perfect knowledge.”240  Hence, a court is just not in a position to second 
guess the merits of a director’s business decision. 
Fourth, the business-judgment rule prevents shareholders from 
impinging on directors’ power and authority to manage the business and 
affairs of corporations.  “If shareholders are granted the right to demand 
frequent judicial review of board decisions, the result would be to 
transfer ultimate decision-making authority from the board to any 
shareholder who is willing to sign a complaint.”241 
Fifth, courts have noted that if shareholders are unhappy with 
director decisions, they can replace the directors.242  Therefore, 
substantive review of a director’s business decision is not necessary. 
Finally, note that the business-judgment rule only applies to business 
decisions.243  Thus, a failure by directors to act is not protected by the 
business-judgment rule unless the directors made a conscious decision 
 
                                                     
 235. Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 236. BLOCK, supra note 194, at 15. 
 237. FDIC v. Stahl, 89 F.3d 1510, 1517 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 238. Joy, 692 F.2d at 886. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. BLOCK, supra note 194, at 17. 
 242. Id. at 18. 
 243. See id. at 60 (noting the requirement of board action). 
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not to act.244  If they simply failed to act because they never considered 
the issue, business-judgment rule protection does not apply.245 
Reinforcing the business-judgment rule, a raincoat provision is a 
provision of a corporation’s articles or certificate of incorporation 
adopted under a director-protection statute that limits or eliminates the 
liability of directors for a breach of the duty of care.246  For example, 
subsection (b)(7) of section 102 of the Delaware General Corporation 
Law allows a corporation to include in its certificate of incorporation “[a] 
provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the 
corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of 
fiduciary duty as a director.”247  The provision, however, may not limit or 
eliminate director liability in the following circumstances: 
(i) For any breach of the director’s duty of loyalty to the corporation or 
its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which 
involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) 
under § 174 of this title [provides for director liability for the wrongful 
payment of dividends or redemption of stock]; or (iv) for any 
transaction from which the director derived an improper personal 
benefit.248 
In addition to Delaware, forty-three states have raincoat provisions in 
their corporate statutes.249  Articles provisions taking full advantage of 
these statutory provisions are almost universally included in the articles 
or certificates of newly incorporated companies, and most companies 
that incorporated prior to the enactment of these statutory provisions 
have amended their articles to take full advantage.250  Hence, it is now 
virtually impossible to prevail on a claim for money damages against a 
director for a decision made solely in breach of the director’s duty of 
care.  This is because to do so the plaintiff would have to overcome both 
                                                     
 244. Id.  See also Aronson v. Lewis, in which the court stated that 
it should be noted that the business judgment rule operates only in the context of director 
action.  Technically speaking, it has no role where directors have either abdicated their 
functions, or absent a conscious decision, failed to act.  But it also follows that under 
applicable principles, a conscious decision to refrain from acting may nonetheless be a 
valid exercise of business judgment and enjoy the protections of the rule. 
473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984). 
 245. BLOCK, supra note 194, at 60. 
 246. See id. at 226. 
 247. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001). 
 248. Id. 
 249. See 1 MBCA ANNOTATED, supra note 199, § 2.02, at 2-31. 
 250. 2 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 201, § 16.03, at 16-5. 
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a raincoat provision and the business-judgment rule presumption.251  
Simply put, a plaintiff would need to plead and prove that the decision 
involved something more than a mere breach of the duty of care, such as 
a breach of the duty of loyalty or bad faith.252 
3. Duty of Loyalty 
In addition to a duty of care, state corporate law imposes on 
corporate directors a duty of loyalty.  The Corporate Director’s 
Guidebook describes the duty of loyalty as follows: 
The duty of loyalty requires a director’s conduct to be in good faith and 
in the best interests of the corporation—and not in the director’s own 
interest or in the interest of another person (such as a family member) 
or an organization with which the director is associated.  Simply put, a 
director should not use the director’s corporate position for personal 
profit or gain or for other personal or noncorporate advantage.253 
The duty of loyalty is implicated whenever a director has a direct or 
indirect financial or personal interest in a transaction involving the 
corporation.254  The duty of loyalty, however, does not establish a blanket 
                                                     
 251. BLOCK, supra note 194, at 229. 
 252. 2 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 201, § 16.03, at 16-8. 
 253. 2004 Director’s Guidebook, supra note 201, at 1070.  The Delaware Supreme Court 
established the seminal formulation of the corporate director duty of loyalty in Guth v. Loft, Inc.: 
  Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their position of trust and 
confidence to further their private interests. While technically not trustees, they stand in a 
fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders. A public policy, existing 
through the years, and derived from a profound knowledge of human characteristics and 
motives, has established a rule that demands of a corporate officer or director, 
peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous observance of his duty, not only 
affirmatively to protect the interests of the corporation committed to his charge, but also 
to refrain from doing anything that would work injury to the corporation, or to deprive it 
of profit or advantage which his skill and ability might properly bring to it, or to enable it 
to make in the reasonable and lawful exercise of its powers.  The rule that requires an 
undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands that there shall be no conflict 
between duty and self-interest.  The occasions for the determination of honesty, good 
faith and loyal conduct are many and varied, and no hard and fast rule can be formulated.  
The standard of loyalty is measured by no fixed scale. 
5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). 
 254. 2004 Director’s Guidebook, supra note 201, at 1070.  See also 1 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra 
note 201, § 4.02, at 4-4.  HMG/Courtland Properties, Inc. v. Gray, 749 A.2d 94 (Del. Ch. 1999), 
provides a classic example of a so-called conflict-of-interest transaction.  In this case, HMG sold real 
estate to NAF Associates.  Id. at 101.  The court found that two directors of HMG breached their 
duties of loyalty to HMG because they owned interests in NAF and the transaction was not entirely 
fair to HMG.  Id. at 118. 
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prohibition against transactions in which a conflict of interest exists.255  
There is nothing inherently wrong with a corporation entering into a 
transaction with a director, and in many situations it may make good 
business sense for the corporation to do so. 256  Hence, many states have 
enacted safe-harbor provisions that protect a transaction from challenge 
solely on the ground that it involves a director conflict of interest if after 
full disclosure regarding the conflict the transaction is approved by a 
majority of disinterested directors or shareholders.257  However, because 
of the obvious potential for abuse in these transactions, if a director is 
sued for breach of the duty of loyalty because the director entered into a 
conflict-of-interest transaction that did not receive the requisite 
disinterested director or shareholder approval, the burden will be on the 
director to prove the fairness of the transaction to the corporation.258 
Neither the business-judgment rule nor an articles raincoat provision 
shields a director from liability for a breach of the duty of loyalty.  If a 
plaintiff is able to plead and prove that a director breached the duty of 
loyalty, the court will conclude that the plaintiff has rebutted the 
business-judgment rule presumption.259 
4. Corporate Law Fiduciary Duties Owed by Officers 
Under state law, corporate officers generally owe the same fiduciary 
duties to the corporation and its shareholders as owed by directors.260  In 
twenty-nine states, this is pursuant to state statute.261  In other states, such 
as Delaware and Maryland, this is pursuant to state common law.262  In 
                                                     
 255. BLOCK, supra note 194, at 266. 
 256. Id. 
 257. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2001); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-419 
(West 2003); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.60–8.63 (1979). 
 258. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.61; BLOCK, supra note 194, at 268. 
 259. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1164 (Del. 1995) (explaining that 
the board of directors lost the presumptive protection by breaching its duty of care). 
 260. A. Gilchrist Sparks III & Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Common Law Duties of Non-Director 
Corporate Officers, 48 BUS. LAW. 215, 217 (1992).  See also 1 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 201, 
§ 1.15, at 1-53 (stating that non-director officers are held to the same standard of care as directors). 
 261. The majority of these states have modeled their provisions on Section 8.42(a) of the MBCA 
ANNOTATED, which provides, “[a]n officer, when performing in such capacity, shall act: (1) in good 
faith; (2) with the care that a person in a like position would reasonably exercise under similar 
circumstances; and (3) in a manner the officer reasonably believes to be in the best interest of the 
corporation.”  2 MBCA ANNOTATED, supra note 199, § 8.42(a), at 8-262, -266. 
 262. See Sparks & Hamermesh, supra note 260, at 217 (compiling cases in multiple jurisdictions 
where courts have held that officers owe fiduciary duties to the corporation); see also Leavy v. Am. 
Fed. Sav. Bank, 764 A.2d 366, 372 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (“Maryland courts have long 
recognized that a corporate officer may not use the corporate office or assets for personal gain.”); 1 
DREXLER, supra note 214, § 14.02, at 14-5. 
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fact, officers may be held to a higher standard than directors.263  “[T]he 
duties of active officers of a corporation who devote all or most of their 
time to a corporation’s business and who receive a salary as officers, are 
more extensive than those of directors who do not give the corporation 
daily attendance and who receive little or no salary.”264 
There is disagreement on whether the business-judgment rule applies 
to decisions of officers.265  Many cases state that the rule applies to 
“officers and/or directors.”266  These statements, however, typically 
appear in cases where the defendants are both directors and officers.267  
Few courts have specifically addressed the issue of whether the business-
judgment rule presumption applies to a decision by a non-director 
officer, and the few that have are split.268  A federal court applying 
Delaware law stated that “[t]he business judgment rule applies only to 
directors of a corporation and not to officers.”269  A California appellate 
court has held likewise under California law.270  However, courts in 
Florida,271 Illinois,272 and New York273 have stated that the business-
judgment rule applies to officers. 
As for raincoat provisions, most states do not allow them to apply to 
anyone other than a corporate director.274  Maryland and a few other 
states, however, do allow corporations to adopt article provisions 
limiting or eliminating the liability of both officers and directors.275  
Hence, depending on the state, an officer may or may not be protected by 
                                                     
 263. See Sparks & Hamermesh, supra note 260, at 218. 
 264. Id. at 219. 
 265. Id. at 230.  See also Lawrence A. Hamermesh & A. Gilchrist Sparks III, Corporate Officers 
and the Business Judgment Rule: A Reply to Professor Johnson, 60 BUS. LAW. 865 (2005); Lyman 
P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439 (2005).  
 266. Sparks & Hamermesh, supra note 260, at 229–30. 
 267. Id. at 230–36. 
 268. See 1 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 201, § 2-1 (“[P]ublic policy and the little case 
authority that exists point in the direction of the same standards of care and business judgment for 
both directors and officers.”). 
 269. Platt v. Richardson, No. 88-0144, 1989 WL 159584, at *2 (M.D. Pa. June 6, 1989). 
 270. Gaillard v. Natomas Co., 256 Cal. Rptr. 702, 711 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). 
 271. See Amerifirst Bank v. Bomar, 757 F. Supp. 1365, 1376 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (“Under the 
business judgment rule officers and directors of a corporation are presumed to have acted properly 
and in good faith.” (citing Int’l Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1461 (11th Cir. 1989))). 
 272. Selcke v. Bove, 629 N.E.2d 747, 750 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). 
 273. Estate of Detwiler v. Offenbecher, 728 F. Supp. 103, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
 274. 2 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 201, § 16.03, at 16-3 to -4. 
 275. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-405.2 (LexisNexis 1999); MD. CODE 
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC., § 5-418 (LexisNexis 2002); see also 2 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 
201, § 16-2 (explaining that state legislation has been enacted since 1986 authorizing charter 
provisions that eliminate or restrict personal liability of directors, and sometimes officers, for money 
damages). 
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the business-judgment rule and may or may not be protected by a 
raincoat provision. 
5. Fiduciary Duties Owed Under State Agency Law 
In addition to state corporate law, fiduciary duties are addressed 
under state agency law.  “Agency is the fiduciary relation which results 
from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other 
shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other 
so to act.”276  The party on whose behalf action is to be taken is referred 
to as the principal, and the party who is to act is referred to as the 
agent.277  An agent owes various fiduciary duties to the principal.278  
These duties include both a duty of care and a duty of loyalty.279  
Restatement of the Law, Second, Agency section 379 provides that “[a] 
paid agent is subject to a duty to the principal to act with standard care 
and with the skill which is standard in the locality for the kind of work 
which he is employed to perform and, in addition, to exercise any special 
skill[s] . . . he has.”280  The comments to this section indicate that this 
duty reflects a negligence standard.281  As for the duty of loyalty, 
Restatement of the Law, Second, Agency section 387 provides that 
“[u]nless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to his principal 
to act solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters connected with 
his agency.”282 
An agent also has a duty to provide information.283  Restatement of 
the Law, Second, Agency section 381 provides “[u]nless otherwise 
agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to use reasonable efforts to give his 
principal information which is relevant to affairs entrusted to him and 
which, as the agent has notice, the principal would desire to have and 
which can be communicated without violating a superior duty to a third 
person.”284  Finally, Restatement of the Law, Second, Agency section 425 
provides as follows: 
                                                     
 276. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958). 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. ch. 13, Topic 1, Introductory Note. 
 279. Id. §§ 379, 387. 
 280. Id. § 379. 
 281. Id. § 379 cmts. b–c. 
 282. Id. § 387. 
 283. Id. § 381. 
 284. Id. 
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Unless otherwise agreed, an agent employed to make or to manage 
investments has a duty to the principal: 
 (a)  to use care to invest promptly; 
 (b) to invest only in such securities as would be obtained by a 
prudent investor for his own account, having in view both 
safety and income, in the light of the principal’s means and 
purposes; and 
 (c)  to change investments in accordance with changes in the 
security of the investments or the condition of the principal, if 
his duties include management.285 
Considering that there is no equivalent to the business-judgment rule 
or raincoat provisions under agency law, presumably it is easier for a 
plaintiff to prove a breach of fiduciary duty for which money damages 
are available under agency law rather than under corporate law.  Note 
that corporate directors are not considered agents of their corporations.286  
Officers and other corporate employees, however, are agents of the 
corporation.287 
D. Federal or State Law? 
Considering the well-developed body of state fiduciary duty law, the 
general lack thereof at the federal level, 288 and references in the section 
36(a) legislative history to “prevailing standards of fiduciary duty,”289 it 
seems obvious that state law should play a role in defining “breach of 
fiduciary duty” under ICA section 36(a).  The question then becomes to 
what extent should state law be incorporated into section 36(a)?290  A 
federal court basically has two options.  Option one, which I refer to as 
“adopting,” is to fully adopt state law on the issue.291  Under this 
                                                     
 285. Id. § 425. 
 286. See id. § 14C (“Neither the board of directors nor an individual director of a business is, as 
such, an agent of the corporation or of its members.”). 
 287. See id. § 2 (“A master is a principal who employs an agent to perform service in his affairs. 
. . .  A servant is an agent employed by a master to perform service in his affairs whose physical 
conduct in the performance of the service . . . is subject to the right to control by the master.”). 
 288. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 289. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
103. 
 290. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal Insider 
Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1208 (1995). 
 291. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 421 (6th ed. 
2002) (discussing federal courts’ options when federal statutes are silent on a particular issue).  
Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979), provides an example of the Supreme Court choosing to adopt.  
See infra text accompanying notes 297–322 for a discussion of the case. 
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approach, federal law will vary depending on which state’s laws are 
applicable.292  Option two, which I refer to as “fashioning,” is to fashion 
independent federal doctrine on the issue, drawing on state law by 
analogy as appropriate.293  For the reasons discussed below, I believe 
federal courts should use a fashioning approach in defining the fiduciary 
duties owed under section 36(a). 
Fashioning appears to be the approach endorsed by the courts in 
many of the cases discussed above in Part IV.A.  For example, the Moses 
court referenced “general principles governing fiduciaries in the area of 
self-dealing” and concluded that they are expressed “through the 
federally imposed standard under section 36, which may vary from state 
common law.”294  Likewise, in both Fogel and Tannenbaum the courts 
stated that section 36 “established a federal standard of fiduciary duty in 
dealings between a mutual fund and its adviser.”295  Finally, in Goldstein 
the court stated that section 36(a) “imposes a federal standard for 
fiduciary obligations owed to shareholders by directors and other officers 
of mutual funds.”296 
Conversely, the Supreme Court chose an adopting approach in Burks 
v. Lasker297 and Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc.298  Both cases 
involved issues under the ICA.  Moses, Tannenbaum, and Fogel were 
decided before Burks and Kamen, so their precedential value on the issue 
can be discounted.  Goldstein, however, was decided after Burks and 
Kamen, but does not discuss either case, putting its precedential value 
into question.  I discuss both Burks and Kamen in detail below. 
In Burks, shareholders of an investment company brought a 
derivative suit against several of the company’s directors and the 
                                                     
 292. See Theresa A. Gabaldon, State Answers to Federal Questions: The Common Law of 
Federal Securities Regulation, 20 J. CORP. L. 155, 159 (1995) (discussing situations where federal 
courts have fully adopted state law on an issue). 
 293. WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 291, at 421.  See also Bainbridge, supra note 290, at 1208 
(discussing the extent to which state law fiduciary duty concepts should be incorporated into federal 
fiduciary duty requirements).  SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946), provides an example of 
the Supreme Court choosing to adopt.  In this case, the Court established the definition of the term 
“investment contract” for purposes of the definition of “security” as used in the Securities Act.  To 
do so, the Court drew on state court decisions addressing the definitional issue under state securities 
regulations to fashion the federal definition.  Id. at 298–99. 
 294. Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369, 376 (1st Cir. 1971). 
 295. Fogel v. Chestnutt, 533 F.2d 731, 745 (2d Cir. 1975); Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 
416 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 296. Goldstein v. Lincoln Nat. Convertible Secs. Fund, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 424, 436 (E.D. Pa. 
2001). 
 297. 441 U.S. 471 (1979). 
 298. 500 U.S. 90 (1991). 
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company’s investment adviser.299  The suit alleged that the defendants 
violated duties owed by them under the ICA, the Investment Advisers 
Act of 1940 (IAA), and common law in connection with an investment 
by the company in Penn Central Transportation Co. commercial paper.300  
In response, the company’s board of directors decided that the five 
directors unaffiliated with the investment adviser and not named in the 
suit would investigate the allegations and determine whether the 
company should continue the suit or move for dismissal.301  The board 
deemed this appropriate because it considered these five directors to be 
disinterested in the matter and five directors constituted a quorum under 
the company’s bylaws.302  After the five directors concluded that 
continuing the litigation was not in the best interests of the company or 
its shareholders, the company moved for dismissal.303  The district court 
held that if the five directors were truly disinterested and independent, 
their decision to move for dismissal was protected by the business-
judgment rule, and therefore not subject to second guessing by the 
court.304  In a later decision, the district court held that the plaintiffs had 
failed to prove that the five directors were not disinterested or 
independent.305  Hence, the district court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the defendants.306 
In granting summary judgment, the district court rejected the 
plaintiffs’ argument that the “broad regulatory legislation” reflected in 
the ICA and IAA prevented disinterested directors from moving to 
dismiss the suit.307  The court held that the five directors had the power to 
move for dismissal, a holding that was in accord with state corporate 
law.308  It appears that the court followed an adopting approach in simply 
applying state corporate law to the issue. 
                                                     
 299. 441 U.S. at 473. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. at 474. 
 302. See Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172, 1175 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (giving a more detailed 
account of the facts). 
 303. Id.  See also Burks, 441 U.S. at 474 (Supreme Court’s discussion of the facts). 
 304. See Lasker, 404 F. Supp. at 1180 (stating that second guessing the directors would disturb 
the good-faith judgment of the directors). 
 305. See Lasker v. Burks, 426 F. Supp. 844, 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (“Plaintiffs have not adduced 
any factual support for their conclusion that the members of the disinterested quorum acted other 
than independently.”), rev’d, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978), rev’d 441 U.S. 471 (1979). 
 306. Id. at 853. 
 307. Lasker, 404 F. Supp. at 1179. 
 308. Id. 
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On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed.309  The circuit court found 
that permitting disinterested directors to dismiss a derivative suit “would 
be contrary to the public interests which Congress has sought to protect” 
through enactment of ICA and IAA.310  It therefore held that 
“disinterested directors of an investment company do not have the power 
to foreclose the continuation of nonfrivolous litigation brought by 
shareholders against majority directors for breach of their fiduciary 
duties.”311  Hence, the court rejected an adopting approach and instead 
fashioned a federal rule on the issue. 
After granting certiorari,312 the Supreme Court reversed.313  The 
Court held that “federal courts should apply state law governing the 
authority of independent directors to discontinue derivative suits to the 
extent such law is consistent with policies of the ICA and IAA.”314  The 
court reasoned that the issue involved determining the powers of 
corporate directors.315  Therefore, the starting point should be state 
corporate law because it “is the font of corporate directors’ power,”316 
whereas “federal law in this area is largely regulatory and prohibitory in 
nature—it often limits the exercise of directorial power, but only rarely 
creates it.”317  Hence, the Court rejected the Second Circuit’s reasoning 
that nothing in ICA or IAA suggested that disinterested directors had the 
power to terminate derivative suits because the “[t]he ICA does not 
purport to be the source of authority for managerial power.”318 
The Court therefore concluded that “[t]he ICA and IAA . . . do not 
require that federal law displace state laws governing the powers of 
directors unless the state laws permit action prohibited by the Acts, or 
unless ‘their application would be inconsistent with the federal policy 
underlying the cause of action.’”319  The Court then found that allowing 
independent directors of an investment company to terminate a 
derivative suit was not inconsistent with the ICA.320  The Court based 
this finding on its conclusion that “the structure and purpose of the ICA 
                                                     
 309. Lasker, 567 F.2d at 1209. 
 310. Id. at 1209. 
 311. Id. at 1212. 
 312. Burks v. Lasker, 439 U.S. 816 (1978). 
 313. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 475 (1979). 
 314. Id. at 486. 
 315. Id. at 478. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. (citing Price v. Gurney, 324 U.S. 100, 107 (1995)). 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. at 479 (quoting Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 465 (1975)). 
 320. Id. at 485. 
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indicate that Congress entrusted to the independent directors of 
investment companies, exercising the authority granted to them by state 
law, the primary responsibility for looking after the interests of the 
funds’ shareholders.”321  Thus, there could be situations where an 
investment company’s independent directors could reasonably believe 
that dismissing a derivative suit was in the best interests of its 
shareholders.322 
Twelve years later, the Court reaffirmed and applied the holding of 
Burks in Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc.323  The case involved 
a derivative suit on behalf of the money-market fund, Cash Equivalent 
Fund, Inc., against the fund’s investment adviser.324  The suit alleged a 
violation of ICA section 20(a), which prohibits the use of materially 
misleading statements in connection with a proxy solicitation.325  
Generally, prior to bringing a derivative suit, a plaintiff must make a 
demand on the corporation’s board of directors to cause the corporation 
to bring the suit itself.326  Many state courts, however, excuse this 
demand requirement if making it would be futile.327  Here, the plaintiff 
asserted that she did not make a demand on the fund’s board of directors 
because doing so would have been futile.328  On appeal, the Seventh 
Circuit found that the plaintiff’s claim was based on federal substantive 
law and hence federal law governed the demand requirement.329  The 
court then held that there was no futility exception to the demand 
                                                     
 321. Id. at 484–85. 
 322. Id. at 485. 
 323. 500 U.S. 90 (1991). 
 324. Id. at 93–94. 
 325. Id. at 93 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 80a-20(a) (2000)). 
 326. JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS 924–25 (2d ed. 2003). 
 327. See id. at 432–33 (stating some states embrace manager-operated firms).  In Marx v. Akers, 
a leading case on the issue of demand futility, the court stated as follows: 
(1) Demand is excused because of futility when a complaint alleges with particularity that 
a majority of the board of directors is interested in the challenged transaction.  Director 
interest may either be self-interest in the transaction at issue, or a loss of independence 
because a director with no direct interest in a transaction is “controlled” by a self-
interested director.  (2) Demand is excused because of futility when a complaint alleges 
with particularity that the board of directors did not fully inform themselves about the 
challenged transaction to the extent reasonably appropriate under the circumstances.  The 
“long-standing rule” is that a director “does not exempt himself from liability by failing 
to do more than passively rubber-stamp the decisions of the active managers.”  (3) 
Demand is excused because of futility when a complaint alleges with particularity that 
the challenged transaction was so egregious on its face that it could not have been the 
product of sound business judgment of the directors. 
666 N.E. 2d 1034, 1040–41 (N.Y. 1996). 
 328. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 908 F.2d 1338, 1341 (7th Cir. 1990), rev’d, 500 U.S. 90 
(1991). 
 329. Id. at 1342. 
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requirement under federal law and affirmed the lower court’s dismissal 
of the claim for failure to make a demand.330 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and addressed the issue of 
whether federal or state law should define the scope of the demand 
requirement.331  The Court started with the proposition that “a court 
should endeavor to fill the interstices of federal remedial schemes with 
uniform federal rules only when the scheme in question evidences a 
distinct need for nationwide legal standards or when express provisions 
in analogous statutory schemes embody congressional policy choices 
readily applicable to the matter at hand.”332  If neither is the case, 
“federal courts should ‘incorporat[e] [state law] as the federal rule of 
decision,’ unless ‘application of [the particular] state law [in question] 
would frustrate specific objectives of the federal programs.’”333  The 
Court then noted that “[t]he presumption that state law should be 
incorporated into federal common law is particularly strong in areas in 
which private parties have entered legal relationships with the 
expectation that their rights and obligations would be governed by state-
law standards,”334 and concluded that “[c]orporation law is one such 
area.”335 
The Court then turned to the question of “whether the demand 
requirement comes within the purview of Burks’s presumption of state-
law incorporation, that is, whether the scope of the demand requirement 
affects the allocation of governing power within the corporation.”336  The 
Court found that the parameters of when a demand is required and when 
it is excused determine “who has the power to control corporate 
litigation,” and hence relate “to the allocation of governing powers 
within the corporation.”337  The Court noted that the “purpose of 
requiring a precomplaint demand is to protect the directors’ prerogative 
to take over the litigation or to oppose it.”338  Therefore, the Court 
reversed the court of appeals decision, and reaffirmed Burks v. Lasker: 
Where a gap in the federal securities laws must be bridged by a rule 
that bears on the allocation of governing powers within the corporation, 
                                                     
 330. Id. at 1347. 
 331. 500 U.S. at 92. 
 332. Id. at 98 (internal citations omitted). 
 333. Id. (quoting United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979)). 
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. 
 336. Id. at 100. 
 337. Id. at 101. 
 338. Id. 
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federal courts should incorporate state law into federal common law 
unless the particular state law in question is inconsistent with the 
policies underlying the federal statute.339 
Incorporating state fiduciary duty law into ICA section 36(a) would 
be inconsistent with the policies underlying the ICA.  As the Supreme 
Court stated in Burks, “Congress’ purpose in structuring the [ICA] as it 
did is clear.  It ‘was designed to place the unaffiliated directors in the 
role of ‘independent watchdogs,’ who would ‘furnish an independent 
check upon the management’ of investment companies.”340  In contrast, 
the role of directors of traditional corporations is not that of watchdogs 
but to provide broad oversight.341  This view is reflected in the Caremark 
case discussed above342—corporate directors have no duty to “ferret out” 
wrongdoing, but they do have a duty “to attempt in good faith to assure 
that a corporate information and reporting system, which the board 
concludes is adequate, exists.”343  In my mind, one role of a watchdog 
may be to ferret out wrongdoing, but the position certainly involves more 
than just providing broad oversight.344  Hence, investment company 
independent directors are held to a higher standard than their 
counterparts at traditional corporations.  It would therefore be 
inconsistent with the policies underlying the ICA to apply state corporate 
law fiduciary duty rules to directors of investment companies. 
Further, investment companies are simply different animals than 
traditional corporations.  As the Court noted in Burks: 
[investment companies], with rare exception, are not operated by their 
own employees.  Most funds are formed, sold, and managed by 
external organizations, [called “investment advisers,”] that are 
separately owned and operated. . . .  The advisers select the funds’ 
investments and operate their businesses. . . . 
 Since a typical fund is organized by its investment adviser which 
provides it with almost all management services . . . , a mutual fund 
cannot, as a practical matter sever its relationship with the adviser.  
Therefore, the forces of arm’s-length bargaining do not work in the 
                                                     
 339. Id. at 108. 
 340. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 484 (1979) (internal citations omitted) (quoting 
Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 406 (2d Cir. 1977)). 
 341. See supra text accompanying notes 201–05.  The Westlaw search I conducted on February 
15, 2005, in the All States database did not locate a single case where a court referred to the directors 
of a traditional corporation as “watchdogs.” 
 342. See supra notes 214–23 and accompanying text. 
 343. In re Caremark Int’l, Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 344. Webster’s Dictionary defines “watchdog” as “one that guards against loss, waste, theft, or 
undesirable practices.”  WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2581 (1981). 
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mutual fund industry in the same manner as they do in other sectors of 
the American economy.345 
The unique structure of investment companies has been 
characterized as “business incest” and as a “corporate anomaly.”346  It 
just does not make sense to apply only state corporate law fiduciary duty 
rules designed for a traditional corporation to a “corporate anomaly.”  
State courts simply have had no occasion to tailor fiduciary duties for the 
unique structure of investment companies.  As demonstrated by the 
recapture cases discussed above, it is sometimes necessary to fashion 
fiduciary duties to deal with misconduct not specifically addressed in the 
ICA.347 
The appropriateness of a fashioning approach is also bolstered by 
subsection (a)(5) of ICA section 1, Findings and Declaration of Policy, 
which provides that “the activities of [investment] companies, extending 
over many States, their use of the instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce and the wide geographic distribution of their security holders, 
make difficult, if not impossible, effective State regulation of such 
companies in the interest of investors.”348  This is because a fashioning 
approach would create national uniform rules, whereas an adopting 
approach would result in variation depending on which state’s laws 
applied.  A similar argument was specifically rejected by the Court in 
Burks.349  In the context of section 36(a), however, the argument is more 
compelling.  Without national uniform rules, three separate bodies of 
state law are potentially relevant—corporate law, business trust law, and 
agency law.  Roughly half of all funds are organized as corporations and 
the other half are organized as business trusts.350  If a fund is organized 
as a corporation, the corporate law of the state of incorporation would 
dictate the fiduciary duties owed by officers and directors of the fund.  If 
the fund is organized as a business trust, the business trust law of the 
state of organization would dictate the fiduciary duties owed by the 
officers and members of the board of trustees of the fund.  Finally, 
                                                     
 345. Burks, 441 U.S. at 480–81 (quoting S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 5 (1969) as repinted in 1910 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897, 4901). 
 346. Clarke Randall, Fiduciary Duties of Investment Company Directors and Management 
Companies under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 31 OKLA. L. REV. 635, 636 (1978). 
 347. For example, as discussed above, federal courts have developed a duty of disclosure owed 
by a fund’s investment advisers and affiliated directors to the fund’s independent directors with 
respect to the possibility of recapture, payment of legal expenses or simultaneous trading.  See supra 
Part IV.A. 
 348. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(a)(5) (2000). 
 349. Burks, 441 U.S. at 479 n. 6. 
 350. ROBERTSON, supra note 25, § 2.02, at 2-12 n.1. 
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because an investment adviser is not an officer, director, or trustee of a 
fund, state agency law would dictate the fiduciary duties owed by the 
investment adviser. 
As the cases discussed above illustrate, it is not uncommon for a 
section 36(a) case to involve claims against some or all of the fund’s 
directors and officers and the fund’s investment adviser.  Hence, if an 
adopting approach were used, a court could find itself having to apply 
the corporate or business trust fiduciary duty rules of the state in which 
the fund is organized, and the agency fiduciary duty rules of the state 
governing the agency relationship between the adviser and the fund 
(which very well could be different from the state in which the fund is 
organized).  This means potentially different standards applied to various 
defendants for the same actions.  Further, an adopting approach may 
impact the application of a fund’s raincoat provision.  Raincoat 
provisions do not generally trump federal law.351  However, one could 
certainly argue that they should trump federal laws that simply 
incorporate state law.  These potential complications would be avoided 
by a fashioning approach. 
Following a fashioning approach for section 36(a) can be 
distinguished from the Court using an adopting approach in Burks and 
Kamen on two additional grounds.  First, in both Burks and Kamen, the 
Court bolstered its decision to adopt state law for the issue under 
consideration because “[t]he ICA does not purport to be the source of 
authority for managerial power; rather, the [ICA] functions primarily to 
‘[impose] controls and restrictions on the internal management of 
investment companies.’”352  In Burks, as discussed above, the Court used 
this proposition to reject the court of appeals’ assertion that disinterested 
directors did not have the power to dismiss a derivative suit because 
nothing in the ICA gave them this power.353  In Kamen, the Court used 
this proposition to reject the court of appeals’ finding of no demand-
futility exception under federal law because the Court viewed such a rule 
as giving directors greater power with respect to derivative litigation than 
state law provided them.354  Conversely, it seems likely that any fiduciary 
duty rules fashioned by federal courts under section 36(a) will either be 
                                                     
 351. See 2 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 201, § 16.02, at 16-4 (“[N]o state statute affects in 
any way any director or officer liability from federal laws; the constitutional preemption doctrine 
gives precedence to federal law over inconsistent state law.”). 
 352. Burks, 441 U.S. at 478 (quoting United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 
705 n.13 (1975)).  See also Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 107 (1990) (quoting 
Burks, 441 U.S. at 478). 
 353. 441 U.S. at 478. 
 354. 500 U.S. at 107–08. 
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addressing issues not addressed under state fiduciary duty law (for 
example, the federal duty to disclose under section 36(a) discussed 
above), or, given the “potential for abuse inherent in the structure of 
investment companies,”355 be at least as strict as, if not stricter than, 
analogous state law.  Both situations are consistent with the ICA function 
of restricting internal management of investment companies. 
Second, both Burks and Kamen involved interstitial lawmaking or 
gap-filling.  The ICA is silent on whether independent directors of an 
investment company could dismiss a derivative claim under the ICA.  
Likewise, the ICA is silent on the scope of the demand requirement in a 
derivative suit.  In fact, the ICA says nothing about derivative suits.  
Hence, the Court filled these gaps through the incorporation of state law.  
In contrast, defining the scope of fiduciary duties owed under ICA 
section 36(a) could fairly be described as statutory interpretation and not 
as interstitial lawmaking.  Federal courts would merely be interpreting 
the statutory language “breach of fiduciary duty.”  It is well accepted that 
federal courts are freer to develop federal rules in the context of statutory 
interpretation as opposed to statutory gap-filling.356 
Finally, using a fashioning approach to section 36(a), which would 
require federal courts to develop fiduciary duty law, is distinguishable 
from Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,357 a case where the Court 
rejected creating a federal law of fiduciary duty for purposes of section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) and Rule 
10b-5 thereunder.358  First, in Santa Fe, the Court was not interpreting 
specific language in a federal statute.  Instead, it was addressing how a 
gap in judicially developed law under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act 
and Rule 10b-5 thereunder should be filled.359  Additionally, the Court 
was concerned that federalizing the standards of fiduciary duty would 
result in “overlap and quite possibly interfere[nce] with state corporate 
law.”360  The Court also stated, “[a]bsent a clear indication of 
congressional intent, the Court should be reluctant to federalize the 
substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions 
in securities, particularly where established state policies of corporate 
                                                     
 355. Burks, 441 U.S. at 480. 
 356. Gabaldon, supra note 292, at 172–73. 
 357. 430 U.S. 462 (1977). 
 358. Id. at 478–79. 
 359. The Court has characterized the jurisprudence under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the 
Exchange Act as “a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn.”  Blue 
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). 
 360. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 479. 
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regulation would be overridden.”361  Applying a fashioning approach to 
section 36(a) would result in some overlap but would neither interfere 
with nor federalize a substantial portion of corporate law.  On the 
contrary, it would only federalize fiduciary duty law with respect to a 
small, finite set of actors—directors, officers, investment advisers, and 
underwriters of investment companies, an area in which state courts have 
had no occasion to delve.  Finally, the Court did indicate in Santa Fe that 
it may be appropriate to federalize fiduciary duty standards in a context 
other than section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.362  ICA section 36(a) is just 
such a context. 
V. “INVOLVING PERSONAL MISCONDUCT” 
As noted above, ICA section 36(a) provides a cause of action for “a 
breach of fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct.”  This section 
explores the issue of what sort of breach involves “personal misconduct.” 
A. Legislative History and Case Law 
The ICA is silent on the meaning of the phrase “involving personal 
misconduct,” but the legislative history of the 1970 amendment to 
section 36 that established this standard does provide some limited 
guidance.  Specifically, the Senate Committee report on the underlying 
bill states that the standard is “not intend[ed] to limit the [SEC] under 
this section to situations where an actual intent to violate the law can be 
shown or to acts of affirmative misconduct.  In appropriate cases, 
nonfeasance of duty or abdication of responsibility would constitute a 
breach of fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct.”363 
Initially, most, if not all, reported cases where a defendant was found 
liable under ICA section 36(a) involved fraud or self-interested 
behavior.364  This led defendants in section 36(a) cases to argue that the 
                                                     
 361. Id. 
 362. See id. at 479–80 (“There may well be a need for uniform federal fiduciary standards to 
govern mergers such as that challenged in this complaint.  But those standards should not be 
supplied by judicial extension of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to ‘cover the corporate universe.’” (quoting 
William L. Cary, Federalism and Corpoate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 
700 (1974))). 
 363. S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 36 (1969). 
 364. See, e.g., SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1002, 1018 (S.D.N.Y. 
1976), aff’d in part, modified in part, 574 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC v. Vintage Group, Inc., 
Litigation Release No. 14319, S7 S.E.C. Docket 1988 (Nov. 2, 1994), available at 1994 WL 
615222; SEC v. Strategic Mgmt., Inc., Litigation Release No. 13701, S4 S.E.C. Docket 1219 (July 9, 
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“involving personal misconduct” standard required a plaintiff to allege 
fraud or self-dealing by the defendant.365 
Several courts, however, disagreed with this interpretation.  For 
example, in Seidel v. Lee,366 the plaintiff, an investor in the ML-Lee 
Acquisition Fund, L.P., brought a class action lawsuit against the 
managing partners of the fund and the fund’s underwriter, among 
others.367  The plaintiff alleged, among other things, that the defendants 
violated section 36(a) of the ICA in connection with recommending an 
alleged unlawful transaction to the fund.368 
Defendants moved to dismiss the claim arguing that “the personal 
misconduct” standard of section 36(a) “only permits liability in cases 
involving self-dealing, conflict of interest or some personal gain to the 
defendant,”369 and the complaint did not allege that the defendants 
engaged in this type of misconduct.370  While the court noted that many 
section 36(a) cases involved one of these three types of misconduct, it 
refused to limit the standard to the three types.371  In support, the court 
noted that in Burks the Supreme Court established that independent fund 
directors serve as watchdogs “whose primary function is to ‘supply an 
independent check on management and to provide a means for the 
representation of shareholder interests in investment company 
affairs.’”372  Hence, the court concluded that a direct breach of fiduciary 
duties “is a form of personal misconduct.”373 
Likewise, in In re Nuveen Fund Litigation,374 plaintiffs brought a 
derivative suit on behalf of two Nuveen mutual funds against the funds’ 
adviser and directors.375  The plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that 
the defendants violated ICA section 36(a) by approving rights offerings 
 
                                                                                                                       
 
1993), available at 1993 WL 268506; see also Benedict & Dulka, supra note 16, at 1196 (describing 
historical application of section 36 in mutual fund mismanagement cases). 
 365. See, e.g., Strougo v. Scudder, Stevens & Clark, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 783, 798 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997). 
 366. No. 94-422-JJF, 1996 WL 903947 (D. Del. Aug. 16, 1996). 
 367. In re ML-Lee Acquisition Fund II, L.P., 816 F. Supp. 973, 974–75 (D. Del. 1993). 
 368. Seidel, 1996 WL 903947, at *8. 
 369. Id. 
 370. Id. 
 371. Id. 
 372. Id. (quoting Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 483 (1979)). 
 373. Id. 
 374. No. 94 C 360, 1996 WL 328006 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 1996). 
 375. Id. at *1. 
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by the funds for the advisers’ benefit rather than for the benefit of the 
funds’ shareholders.376 
As in Seidel, defendants argued that “the duty under § 36(a) cannot 
reach all misconduct governed under a traditional fiduciary duty.”377  
Here, however, the defendants pointed to a principal of statutory 
construction—“statutory language should not be treated as 
surplusage”378—and argued that interpreting section 36(a) to encompass 
any breach of fiduciary duty would treat the statutory language 
“involving personal misconduct” as surplusage.379  In addition, the 
defendants noted that the Senate Report from the 1970 amendments to 
section 36 states that it “is not intended to provide a basis for the 
Commission to undertake a general revision of the practices or structures 
of the investment company industry,”380 and argued that “this language 
indicates that Congress did not intend that § 36(a) reach all breaches of 
due care.”381 
The court found that “§ 36(a) contemplates allegations of a director’s 
gross neglect of his responsibility to supervise and inform himself of the 
investment adviser’s management of the fund.”382  The court based this 
finding on the legislative history of the 1970 amendment mentioned 
above with respect to “nonfeasance of duty” or “abdication of 
responsibility” potentially constituting “a breach of fiduciary duty 
involving personal misconduct.”383  It also mentioned the independent 
watchdog role of directors established in Burks.384  Finally, the court 
cited a House of Representatives committee report with respect to the 
1980 amendments to the ICA, which similarly stated that section 36(a) 
“extends to personal misconduct evidenced by misfeasance or 
nonfeasance in carrying out legal responsibilities as well as self-dealing 
and other examples of unjust enrichment.”385 
The court reached a similar conclusion in Strougo v. Scudder, 
Stevens & Clark, Inc.386  In this case, the plaintiff, a shareholder of The 
                                                     
 376. Id. at *2, *9. 
 377. Id. at *11. 
 378. Id. (citing Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 141 (1994)). 
 379. Id. 
 380. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 91-184 (1969)). 
 381. Id. 
 382. Id. 
 383. Id. at 12. 
 384. Id. 
 385. Id. n.7 (quoting H.R. Rep. 96-1341, at 26 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4800, 
4808). 
 386. 964 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
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Brazil Fund, Inc., a closed-end fund, brought a class action lawsuit 
against the fund’s investment adviser and directors.387  The plaintiff 
alleged, among other things, that the defendants breached section 36(a) 
in connection with their involvement in the development and 
implementation of a rights offering by the fund.388  In particular, the 
plaintiff claimed that the defendants launched the rights offering to 
increase the fund’s capital, which would thereby increase the adviser’s 
compensation,389 and that this constituted a breach of the fiduciary duties 
of loyalty and due care.390 
Defendants moved to dismiss the section 36(a) claim on grounds that 
the plaintiff “failed to allege ‘personal misconduct’ within the meaning 
of the statute.”391  Specifically, the defendants argued that the phrase 
“involving personal misconduct” required the plaintiff to “allege more 
than a ‘mere’ beach of fiduciary duty.”392  They supported this 
interpretation by noting that “most cases imposing liability under section 
36(a) have involved allegations of fraud, self-dealing, or some likelihood 
of direct personal financial advantage to be derived from the transactions 
in question.”393  They then pointed out that as discussed above, prior to 
1970, the analogous standard was “gross misconduct or abuse of 
trust.”394  When the Senate was considering a different standard, the SEC 
had proposed to lower the standard to a simple “breach of fiduciary 
duty.”395  The Senate, however, rejected this standard, noting that it 
would allow for section 36 claims “based on ‘nothing more than a 
difference of opinion about the most debatable management 
problems.’”396  The defendants therefore argued that this rejection 
indicated that the “personal misconduct” standard involved more than a 
mere breach of a fiduciary duty, i.e., it required fraud or self dealing.397 
The court rejected these arguments and therefore denied the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss the section 36(a) claim.398  The court 
based its decision on several grounds.  First, the court reasoned that: 
                                                     
 387. Id. at 787. 
 388. Id. at 788. 
 389. Id. at 789. 
 390. Id. at 788. 
 391. Id. at 798. 
 392. Id. 
 393. Id. 
 394. Id. at 799. 
 395. Id. 
 396. Id. (citing S. 1659, 90th Cong. § 20 (1967)). 
 397. Id. at 798–99. 
 398. Id. at 798. 
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Section 36 . . . was designed as a “reservoir of fiduciary obligations” to 
prevent more “subtle abuses . . . not otherwise specifically dealt with in 
the Act.”  Such abuses include a director’s “lack of independence 
resulting in the subordination of the stockholders’ interest to that of 
management.”  [Plaintiff] has alleged that precisely such a lack of 
independence led the directors to approve the Rights Offering to benefit 
[the corporation], without regard to the consequences for the Fund.399 
Second, the court examined the legislative history of the 1970 
amendments and concluded “[it] does not indicate an intention to require 
allegations of fraud or self-dealing.”400  Like the court in Nuveen, it based 
this conclusion on the legislative history mentioned above with respect to 
“nonfeasance of duty” or “abdication of responsibility” potentially 
constituting “a breach of fiduciary duty involving personal 
misconduct.”401  Third, the court stated that “[a]lthough, as defendants 
note, most of the cases finding section 36(a) liability involved fraud or 
self-dealing, defendants do not cite any case law squarely rejecting a 
claim under section 36(a) for failure to allege fraud or self-dealing.”402 
The court in Young v. Nationwide Life Insurance Company403 
followed reasoning similar to the above cases in refusing to limit the 
phrase “involving personal misconduct” to misconduct involving “self-
dealing or personal impropriety.”404  Like the Nuveen and Strougo courts, 
it cited the “nonfeasance of duty” and “abdication of responsibility” 
language in the legislative history of the 1970 amendment to section 
36.405  Like the Seidel and Nuveen courts, it also recited the role of 
independent directors established by Burks.406  Finally, like the Strougo 
court, it noted that “[d]efendants have failed to cite any authority 
rejecting a [section 36(a)] claim where self-dealing or conflicts of 
interest are not involved.”407 
The courts in the above cases make clear that in their view the 
section 36(a) “involving personal misconduct” standard is not limited to 
fraud, self-dealing, conflict of interest, or the like.  They do not make 
clear, however, whether any breach of fiduciary duty “involves personal 
misconduct.”  Seidel may suggest that the answer is yes because, as 
                                                     
 399. Id. (citations omitted). 
 400. Id. at 799. 
 401. Id.  See supra text accompanying note 383. 
 402. Id. 
 403. 2 F. Supp. 2d 914 (S.D. Tex. 1998). 
 404. Id. at 927. 
 405. Id. 
 406. Id. 
 407. Id. 
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noted above, Seidel states that a direct breach of fiduciary duties “is a 
form of personal misconduct.”408  Seidel does not, however, define 
“direct breach,” so it is unclear whether it means “any breach” or 
something less than “any breach.” 
In the recent case of SEC v. PIMCO Advisors Fund Management 
LLC409 the court was clear on whether any breach of fiduciary duty 
“involves personal misconduct.”  The case involved an enforcement 
action by the SEC against the investment advisers and related entities of 
certain PIMCO mutual funds and Stephen Treadway and Kenneth Corba, 
each of whom served in various executive capacities for the advisers and 
related entities.410  The enforcement action arose out of an alleged 
arrangement orchestrated by Treadway and Corba on behalf of various 
PIMCO entities that allowed Canary Capital411 to engage in market 
timing412 in certain PIMCO funds.413 
The SEC settled with the PIMCO entities but continued to pursue 
claims against Treadway and Corba.414  In particular, the SEC alleged 
that Treadway and Corba violated ICA section 36(a) through their 
involvement in the Canary arrangement.415  In denying Treadway’s 
motion to dismiss the section 36(a) claim, the court held that “to 
demonstrate a violation of section 36(a), the SEC does not have to allege 
fraud or self-dealing; instead, it must demonstrate an accepted breach of 
fiduciary duty via affirmative acts or, in [sic] ‘in appropriate cases, 
nonfeasance of duty or abdication of responsibility.’”416  The court did 
not, however, provide much support for this broad interpretation of 
“involving personal misconduct” other than quoting from Strougo.417 
In contrast to PIMCO is the recent case of Prescott v. Allstate Life 
Insurance Co.418  In Prescott, the plaintiffs entered into annuity contracts 
with the defendant that allowed the plaintiffs to transfer funds “quickly 
and freely” among various investments, including mutual funds.419  
                                                     
 408. See supra note 373 and accompanying text. 
 409. 341 F. Supp. 2d 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 410. Id. at 458. 
 411. See supra Part I for information regarding Canary Capital. 
 412. See supra Part I for a description of market timing. 
 413. PIMCO Advisors Fund Mgmt., 341 F. Supp. 2d at 459. 
 414. Id. at 462. 
 415. Id. at 471–72. 
 416. Id. at 471 (quoting Strougo v. Scudder, Stevens & Clark, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 783, 799 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997)). 
 417. Id. 
 418. 341 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
 419. Id. at 1025–26. 
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Notwithstanding these contracts, the defendant later disallowed the 
plaintiffs’ requests to transfer money between certain funds and to 
withdraw money from certain funds.420  Hence, the plaintiffs brought suit 
claiming, among other things, that in disallowing these requests, the 
defendant violated ICA section 36(a).421 
The defendant moved to dismiss the section 36(a) claim asserting 
that the plaintiff had “failed to plead personal misconduct.”422  The court 
granted the motion reasoning that 
[section] 36(a) does not provide redress for a general breach of 
fiduciary duty. Rather, a cognizable claim must contain allegations of a 
breach “involving personal misconduct;” to hold otherwise would 
render these modifying words in the statute superfluous.  While other 
courts have adopted more liberal standards for section 36(a) claims, we 
find that “personal misconduct” refers to “misconduct that involves 
self-dealing by investment company or other insiders.”423 
In further support of this interpretation of section 36(a), the court 
noted that “Congress adopted the ICA primarily to address the unique 
problems of investment adviser self-dealing in the investment fund 
industry.”424  Hence, presumably section 36(a) should be interpreted to 
require self-dealing in light of this primary purpose. 
B. Recommended Interpretation 
As the above discussion demonstrates, courts disagree as to the 
appropriate interpretation of the “involving personal misconduct” 
standard of ICA section 36(a).  For the reasons discussed below, the 
standard should be interpreted to reflect the substance of the business-
judgment rule—an enumerated party under section 36(a) is not liable for 
what turns out to be a bad business decision as long as the party made the 
decision “on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that 
the action taken was in the best interests of the company.”425  As pointed 
out by the Nuveen, Strougo, and Young courts, interpreting the phrase to 
                                                     
 420. Id. 
 421. Id. at 1029. 
 422. Id. 
 423. Id. at 1029 (citations omitted). 
 424. Id. at 1029. 
 424. Id. (quoting In re Nuveen Fund Litig., No. 94 C 360, 1996 WL 328006, at *10 (N.D. Ill. 
June 11, 1996)). 
 425. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).  See also Yost v. Early, 589 A.2d 1291, 
1298 (Md. 1991) (quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812); BLOCK, supra note 194, at 5. 
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go beyond self dealing and personal impropriety is consistent with the 
legislative history of section 36(a).  Further, as pointed out by the Seidel, 
Nuveen, and Young courts, such an interpretation is also consistent with 
the teaching of Burks that Congress intended unaffiliated directors of 
investment companies to serve as independent watchdogs. 
My proposed interpretation is supported by another portion of the 
legislative history of the 1970 amendments to section 36.  Specifically, 
as discussed above, when the Senate was considering changing the pre-
1970 “gross misconduct or abuse of trust” standard, the SEC proposed 
going with a simple “breach of fiduciary duty” standard.426  The Senate, 
however, rejected the SEC’s proposed standard, reasoning that it would 
allow for section 36(a) claims “based on ‘nothing more than a difference 
of opinion about the most debatable management problems.’”427  This 
suggests that the “involving personal misconduct” standard was included 
to foreclose section 36(a) liability for nothing more than a bad business 
decision, just as the business-judgment rule forecloses courts from 
second guessing a bad business decision unless the decision maker was 
not adequately informed, acted in bad faith, or did not believe the 
decision was in the best interest of the company.  Hence, I assert that the 
phrase “involving misconduct” was not chosen to limit liability to 
misconduct involving self-dealing or fraud but to federalize the 
substance of the business-judgment rule for purposes of section 36(a). 
My interpretation of the “involving personal misconduct” standard 
also makes sense in light of the soon-to-be effective requirement that 
seventy-five percent of a fund’s board be comprised of independent 
directors.428  This new requirement will likely result in a need for 
additional people to serve as independent fund directors—people who 
will take on the role of independent watchdogs and “bring to the 
boardroom a ‘high degree of rigor and skeptical objectivity to the 
evaluation of management and its plans and proposals.’”429  Considering 
the current climate of ongoing litigation against fund boards, it may be 
difficult to attract and retain qualified people to serve as independent 
directors.  At the same time, in view of the recent improprieties at 
various funds and the continued reliance on independent directors to 
protect the interests of fund shareholders,430 the watchdogs must have 
some degree of accountability.  My interpretation strikes the appropriate 
                                                     
 426. Strougo v. Scudder, Stevens & Clark, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 783, 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 427. Id. (citing S. 1659, 90th Cong., § 20 (1967)). 
 428. See supra text accompanying note 87. 
 429. Investment Company Governance Release, supra note 15, at *3. 
 430. See id. 
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balance between attracting competent individuals to serve as independent 
fund directors and holding the watchdogs accountable.  As noted above, 
one of the rationales behind the business-judgment rule is to 
“encourage[s] competent individuals to become directors who otherwise 
might decline for fear of personal liability.”431 
My interpretation would also extend a type of business-judgment 
rule protection from section 36(a) liability to investment advisers.  As 
discussed above, an investment adviser is an agent of the fund it advises.  
Hence, it owes various fiduciary duties to the fund under state agency 
law.  However, there is no equivalent to the business-judgment rule 
under state agency law.  In the context of this particular agency 
relationship, something like business-judgment rule protection is 
warranted.  The primary job of a fund’s investment adviser is to “manage 
the fund’s assets in accordance with the fund’s investment objectives.”432  
This requires the investment adviser to make daily business decisions 
with respect to what securities the fund should buy, sell, and hold.  Given 
the nature of investing, many of these decisions will turn out to be bad 
decisions, e.g., the adviser might decide to buy a stock that later 
decreases in value or to sell a stock that later increases in value.  
Certainly, an investment adviser should not be liable under section 36(a) 
for a bad investment decision that was made with adequate information, 
in good faith, and in the honest belief it was in the best interest of the 
fund.  This conclusion is strongly supported by the rationale behind the 
business-judgment rule.433  Specifically, as stated earlier, because 
“potential profit often corresponds to potential risk, it is very much in the 
interest of shareholders that the law not create incentives for overly 
cautious corporate decisions.”434  This is particularly true with respect to 
investment advisers.  Managing a fund’s portfolio is all about taking 
calculated risks, and the law should not discourage investment advisers 
from taking these risks.  In fact, the ICA recognizes the risk-taking 
nature of managing a portfolio through the requirement to describe these 
risks in the fund prospectus furnished to investors.435 
                                                     
 431. Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. UAL Corp., 717 F. Supp. 575, 582 (N.D. Ill. 1989).  See also 
BLOCK, supra note 194, at 12. 
 432. MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK, supra note 19, at 8. 
 433. See supra text accompanying notes 232–45. 
 434. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. 
 435. See SEC Form N-1A, Item 4.c., available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formn-la.pdf 
(“Disclose the principal risks of investing in the Fund, including the risks which the Fund’s 
particular portfolio as a whole is expected to be subject and the circumstances reasonably likely to 
affect adversely the Fund’s net asset value, yield, or total return.”). 
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Finally, the “involving personal misconduct” standard should be 
interpreted to be met even by non-action of the enumerated parties.  This 
point is clear from the legislative history of section 36(a).  As noted 
above, the relevant Senate Report states that the standard is “not 
intend[ed] to limit . . . section [36(a)] to situations where an actual intent 
to violate the law can be shown or to acts of affirmative misconduct.  In 
appropriate cases, nonfeasance of duty or abdication of responsibility 
would constitute a breach of fiduciary duty involving personal 
misconduct.”436  This language was cited with approval by the courts in 
Nuveen, Strougo, Young, and PIMCO.437  Additionally, a House 
committee report about the 1980 amendments to the ICA similarly stated 
that section 36(a) “extends to personal misconduct evidenced by 
misfeasance or nonfeasance in carrying out legal responsibilities.”438 
Consistent with state law, protection like that provided by the 
business-judgment rule should not be afforded to nonfeasance of duty 
unless the nonfeasance involved a conscious decision not to act, and this 
decision was made on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest 
belief that not acting was in the best interest of the investment 
company.439  Again, the business-judgment rule only protects a business 
judgment.  If no judgment is made, the business-judgment rule is 
inapplicable, and the same analysis should apply to section 36(a).440 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In the wake of the mutual fund scandal, many plaintiffs have sought 
to tap the section 36(a) “reservoir of fiduciary obligations” in an effort to 
hold accountable fund officers, directors, and investment advisers.  The 
interpretation of the section 36(a) phrase “breach of fiduciary duty 
involving personal misconduct,” however, remains unsettled.  To aid in 
settling the issue, this Article has proposed that federal courts fashion 
federal law as to what fiduciary duties are owed under section 36(a), 
drawing on analogous state law as appropriate.  As discussed above, this 
approach is consistent with the holdings in Burks441 and Kamen.442  More 
                                                     
 436. Senate Report, supra note 101, at 36. 
 437. See Young v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 2 F. Supp. 2d 454, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); SEC v. 
PIMCO Advisors Fund Mgmt., 341 F. Supp. 2d 454, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Strougo v. Scudder, 
Stevens & Clark, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 783, 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); In re Nuveen, No. 94 C 360, 1996 
WL 328006, at *10 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 1996). 
 438. H.R. REP. NO. 96-1341, at 26 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4800, 4808. 
 439. See supra notes 243–45 and accompanying text. 
 440. See BLOCK, supra note 194, at 60. 
 441. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979). 
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importantly, this approach allows federal courts to tailor fiduciary duty 
rules for the unique investment company structure as opposed to simply 
applying state fiduciary duty rules developed for traditional corporations. 
This Article has also asserted that the “involving personal 
misconduct” standard of section 36(a) should be interpreted to 
encompass more than just self-dealing and personal impropriety.  
Specifically, the standard should encompass any decision that was not 
made on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the 
action taken was in the best interest of the company.  This interpretation 
strikes the appropriate balance between attracting competent individuals 
to serve as independent fund directors and holding the watchdogs 
accountable.  This interpretation would also extend business-judgment-
rule-type protection to investment advisers, a result warranted by the 
risk-taking nature of portfolio management. 
                                                                                                                       
 
 442. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90 (1991). 
